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The euro-area crisis dominates the economic news. Yet, the world and Europe may











limiting the temperature rise to less than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial
levelsappearsincreasinglyillusory.Currently,fossilenergysourcesdominatemany




Economic growth in Europe will be affected by the costs of this transition from the
currentenergyandtransportsystem.Asmoothtransitiontowardsalow-carbonenergy
and transport system could come at comparatively modest cost. Furthermore,
identifyingthemosteconomicallybeneficialsolutionsearlyonandbecomingaglobal






ixis needed. Policy intervention appears indispensable as the energy and transport
systemissobasedaroundandlocked-inintoanincumbenttechnology.Overcoming
this lock-in is crucial. The report makes three main proposals. First, the scope,
geographicalcoverageanddurationofcarbonpricingshouldbeextended.Bysetting






The technological, economic and political challenge ahead is vast. But choosing the







The major challenge facing the energy and transport system is the reduction of its
fossil fuel consumption and carbon footprint. This requires a shift in the way we
produce and consume energy. Due to the limited carbon-reduction potential of
incumbent technologies, new low-carbon technologies will have to enter the






incumbent technologies, or that downstream changes are minimal. Presently, most
low-carbonenergyandtransporttechnologiesmeetneitherofthesecriteria:theyare
moreexpensivethanthetechnologiestheyreplacebutoﬀerlittle,ifany,advantage,
and they require substantial downstream changes to the incumbent energy or




Markets alone will not encourage the development and deployment of un-
competitive technologies, even if they are necessary for a low-carbon future. In
order to encourage the development of these technologies, it is important to
monetisethesocietalbenefitstheyprovidebyputtingpricesongreenhousegases,
pollution, noise, and import dependency. In the absence of first-best solutions
(for example a global long-term carbon price) policymakers should build on
existinginstrumentsinordertoprovidesufficientincentivesforearlyinvestment
1into research and development, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon
technologies.
Innovation is essential to develop the required new technologies. Without eﬀective




new technologies supplant the incumbent system without favouring one of the
alternatives.
A key to success is domestic and international, and public and private cooperation.
Leaving coordination entirely to the market might result in late deployment and
fragmented networks and markets. Some technologies require a completely new
underlying infrastructure. This infrastructure has a high cost that may not be fully








business models has a high social value. It provides important information to con-
sumers,competitorsandpoliticsabouttheviabilityoftechnologies.
Some low-carbon technologies might never be commercialised because better
alternativesexist.However,continuingtofundthesetechnologiesmightbeessential
in case the ﬁrst-best alternative fails to deliver. In this case, having a back-stop











to make the necessary investments. Consequently, without public intervention, the
transitionwillonlyhappenslowlyormaynottakeplaceatall.
Fuelcellelectricvehicleswillnotbeprovidedbythemarketalone
We use the example of fuel cell electric vehicles to demonstrate that certain low-
carbon technologies only enter the market if at least some of the market failures
previously described are resolved. This example was chosen because fuel cell




absent from the vehicle market in 2050 while incumbent technologies (gasoline,
diesel) will still play a major role. We show that this changes when policies are
implementedtoaccountfortheemissioncostofconventionalvehicles,supportto
R&D is provided and the infrastructure externality is overcome. With such a con-
certed approach, fuel cell electric vehicles might become an important transport
technologyby2050,accountingformorethan10percentofthemarket.Earlycost
reductions(suchasthroughR&D)areessentialtoovercomethegapthatprevents





that are intended to address the market failures. Fuel taxes, vehicle emission
standardsandR&Dfunding,forexample,canbeeﬀectivetoolsfortacklingsomeofthe
barriers. However, the totality of current policies is insuﬃcient to resolve the market
failuresthathamperthetransition.ThereareinsuﬃcientfundsforR&D,nogloballong-
termcarbonprice,anddeploymenteﬀortsarenotcoordinated.Mostimportantly,no





3deployment of the technologies needed for the energy and transport system
transition,asetofsmartpoliciesneedstobeimplemented.
First of all, the cost of carbon in diﬀerent sectors needs to be aligned in order to
stimulateeﬃcientemission-mitigationbehaviour.Thus,allformsoftransportshould
beincludedintheEuropeanUnionemissionstradingsystem(ETS).Acorresponding
additional carbon component in the fuel price would ensure that consumers’ daily
modalchoicedecisionstakethecarboncostintoaccountandthuspreventlowerfuel
consumption incentivising increased vehicle use. Second, policymakers need to
convince companies that carbon will continue to be sensibly priced beyond 2020.
Thus,policyshouldﬁnanciallycommittheirfuturebudgetsvis-à-viscompaniesthat
invest in low-carbon technologies to preserve the operability of the EU ETS beyond
2020.Thiscould,forexample,beachievedbylettingpublicbanksissueoptionsonthe
carbonprice.Signiﬁcantexposureofpublicbankstothecarbonpricecouldserveas
a tool to commit future policymakers to ensuring the reliability of the system over
decades. Third, tightening average emission standards for certain appliances is an
eﬀectivesecond-bestsolutionforincentivisingtheprovisionoflow-carbonappliances
intheabsenceofaglobalandlong-termcarbonprice.
To provide the refuelling stations for new fuels that existing markets will not deliver,
we suggest the establishment of temporary infrastructure consortia for the diﬀerent
low-carbonfuels.Eachconsortiumwouldplanandorganisethedeploymentofitsres-
pective fuelling station infrastructure. For this purpose, each consortium would be
given the exclusive right to sell local concessions for new fuel stations to interested
retailers.Consequently,competitionbetweendiﬀerentlow-carbonfuelsanddiﬀerent
retailers would be ensured. Finally, each consortium might organise internal cross-
subsidisationbetweendiﬀerentpartsofthevaluechain(forexample,fuelandvehicle
producers might support infrastructure) and between diﬀerent fuel stations (for
example,fueloutletsinremoteareasmightobtainsupportfromfueloutletsindensely
populatedareas),ifitﬁndsthatthisencouragesquickerroll-outoftheirtechnology.To
avoid abuse, all relevant stakeholders should participate in the consortia and their
constitutionshouldbeclearedexantebycompetitionauthorities.
Furthermore,thepublicandprivatesectorsshouldexplorenewwaysofsharingrisk.
Governments might participate in the up-side of successful technologies by making
grants reimbursable in successful cases. Meanwhile public ﬁnancing or guarantees
dedicated to business units with a high concentration of regulatory risks might
incentivise investment for two reasons. First, the corresponding company would be
less exposed to regulatory uncertainty and might ﬁnd it easier to acquire private
THEGREATTRANSFORMATION
4ﬁnanceforitslow-carbonprojects.Second,publicexposuretoregulatoryrisksignals
commitment to existing policies and reduces regulatory uncertainty in the private
sectorasawhole.
One major improvement to current deployment policies would be to use public
procurementstrategicallyforexperimentingwithalternativetechnologies.Wesuggest
that publicly ﬁnanced trials (for example, for municipal vehicle ﬂeets) should be
allowedtofailcommerciallyinordertoavoidthefocusonlow-risktechnologies.Forthis






failures, the public sector should return to technology-speciﬁc support instruments
forR&Danddeployment.Inthiscontext,technologychoiceiscritical.Inthepresence
ofmultiplenewtechnologiesthatcompetenotonlyforamarketbutalsoforproduction




adaptable, able to digest new information and optimise support in a quick, reliable,
and eﬀective manner. Predictability and technology-neutrality can only be ensured




be built, maintained, extended and published by an independent public institution.
This transparent mechanism would ensure that stakeholders can predict public
technology decisions, and would thus ﬁnd it easier to commit to the long-term and







The current energy and transport system is unsustainable. In 2009, emissions of










EU considers reducing/containing this dependence to be an important factor in
securingEuropeanenergysupplies.Asdomesticsourcesoffossilfuelsarelimited,
onlyareductioninthetotalconsumptionoffossilfuelscanreduceEurope’simport
dependency. Consequently, the major challenge facing the energy and transport
6
1. 4.8tonnesisaresultofacalculationusingdataonpage80ofEEA(2011).In2009,GHGemissionspercapita,for
the EU27, was 9.2 tonnes. According to the pie charts, transport share of GHG emissions was 20.2 percent and
energy supply share of GHG emissions was 32.4 percent, implying that approximately 4.8 tonnes per capita of
GHGemissionsareduetothetransportandenergysector.
2. COM(2011)144,availableathttp://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0144:EN:NOT




With the current fuel mix5, even the most ambitious improvements to incumbent
technologiesarelikelytobeinsuﬃcientforreachingthereductiontargetssetbythe
EU. For example, improvements to motor vehicle internal combustion engines and
conventional power plants are limited by physical factors. Fuel consumption would
converge to a technical minimum that is signiﬁcantly above zero. Consequently, the
deployment of new clean energy and transport technologies would be necessary to
maintainthecurrentservicelevelatnearzeroemissions.
Anadditionalmotivationforcarbon-freetechnologiesisthattheyoftenoﬀersigniﬁcant
side-beneﬁts. For example, internal combustion engines are responsible for a
signiﬁcant portion of local pollutant6 and noise emissions. For this reason, internal
combustionenginesare,incontrasttosomeoftheproposedalternativetechnologies,
also detrimental to public health. Thus, signiﬁcant societal beneﬁts, in terms of
greenhousegasmitigation,decreasedfueldependency,andreducedlocalemissions
of pollutants and noise, can be expected as results of a transition towards a clean
energyandtransportsector.




1. Keynesian demand stimulus for short-term job creation via deﬁcit-ﬁnanced
investmentinenergyeﬃciencyandenergyinfrastructure:forexample,Houseret
al (2009, 2-5) ﬁnds that green stimulus in the US performed as well as or better













as the ‘Porter Hypothesis’): Porter and van der Linde (1995) argue that stringent
regulationpaysforitselfbyinducingprivatesectorinnovation.Additionally,WEF-
BCG (2011) argues that companies that comply with stricter standards do better
economically7.
4. Publicly supported deployment creates markets for new technologies that might
haveahigherthanproportionatelocalvaluecontent.Thus,newjobsmightemerge
(Weietal,2010).
5. Revenues from a ‘polluter pays’ scheme – such as emission allowance auction




clean technologies might help some countries retain or even strengthen their
internationalcompetitiveness,therebyboostingtheireconomiesandcreatingjobs.









of transformations over time: from wood to coal, coal to oil, and to electriﬁcation. In
eachofthesecases,thenewenergysourceprovedcheaperormoreversatilethanthe








whichpostulatesthat,afteracertainthreshold,pollutionintensitydecreaseswithincreasingeconomicactivity.Therefore, rapid diﬀusion of new technologies requires them to have either serious
advantages over incumbent technologies or minimal downstream changes to work.
Presently, ‘green’ energy and transport technologies meet neither of these criteria:
they generate more expensive but, at best, indistinguishable services compared to
the technologies they replace, and they require substantial downstream changes to
theincumbentenergyortransportsysteminordertoaccommodatediﬀerentprimary
inputs and diﬀerent operating characteristics. Thus, the inertia witnessed in prior
transformationsmayprovideonlyaconservativeestimateforthescaleofthegreen
energy and transport transition challenge. The deployment of new energy and
transport technologies will be hampered by their higher cost and technical
shortcomings (eg range for battery cars, temperature sensitivity for fuel cell cars,
volatility of the electricity produced by wind turbines). Markets alone will not
encourage the development and deployment of uncompetitive technologies, even if
theyarenecessaryforalow-carbonfuture.Inordertoencouragethedevelopmentof
thesetechnologies,itisimportanttomonetisethesocietalbeneﬁtstheyprovideby
putting prices on greenhouse-gases, pollution, noise, and import dependency. But
evenaftermonetisingthesocietalbeneﬁts,thereareextantmarketfailureswhichmay






Cumulative greenhouse-gas emissions cause global warming, implying potentially
hugeeconomiccoststosociety8.Thus,eachsourceofgreenhouse-gasemissionshas
asocietalcost(asocalled‘negativeexternality’).Tointroducethecorrectincentives
for greenhouse-gas mitigation, various schemes have been proposed. The spectrum
ranges from administrative measures, such as the prohibition of certain polluting
technologies or emission restrictions, to the implementation of a ‘polluter pays’
principleviacarbontaxesortradableemissionallowances.
Ideally, the introduction of a long-term carbon price reﬂecting the true cost of








local carbon price has only a limited eﬀect on overall abatement. The reason is that
greenhouse-gas-emitting companies or sectors might move to countries without a
carbon price (carbon leakage) or that, due to reduced demand for fossil fuels in the
countrieswithastrictcarbonprice,fuelpriceswilldecreaseandresultinhigherfuel
demand elsewhere (indirect leakage); (3) ﬁnally, there are numerous political




















EU, for example, signiﬁcant support for renewable energy technologies and energy
eﬃciencyispartlyjustiﬁedascompensatingtheimperfectionsofthecarbonmarket.
Theﬂipsideofhavingmultipleinstrumentstoincentiviseemissionreductionsisthat
it inevitably leads to diﬀerent prices for carbon in diﬀerent sectors. According to
Fankhauseretal(2010),combiningtaxes,subsidies,orstandardswithcap-and-trade
instruments can undermine the carbon price and increase mitigation costs. That is,






Conclusion: Climate change is a pressing issue which poses huge negative exter-
nalities. There is currently no eﬀective policy tool for internalising the long-term
internationalcostsofclimatechange.
Recommendation:Policyshouldcontinuetostriveforagloballong-termcarbonprice.
Moreover, policy should complement existing instruments with incentives for early




cost of R&D. Although acquired knowledge may oﬀset the cost of innovation for the
investingﬁrm,thisknowledgemaybenon-rivalandnon-excludable.Thismeansthat




externality to outside ﬁrms. This results in a situation where individual ﬁrms under-
invest in R&D because they do not fully internalise the social beneﬁts of R&D
investments or because they anticipate costless beneﬁts to be gained from the
investmentsofothers.
This eﬀect is present in all sectors. In order to facilitate the internalisation of this
externality, several policy instruments are available: protecting intellectual property
rights(egthroughpatentsortradesecrets),governmentfundingforR&Dandsubsidies
forprivateR&D.
Patents are a tool for removing the non-excludable aspect of innovations. Making
innovations excludable would prevent ﬁrms that did not participate in R&D from
reapingthebeneﬁtsoftheresultingtechnologyatzerocost.Inaddition,excludability
hastheaddedbeneﬁtofreducingincentivestosecrecyovertechnologicalknowledge
which may beneﬁt society. However, patents are an imperfect tool. A strong patent
system increases incentives to innovate but decreases competition. As per
Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction, market power is a driving force of
THEGREATTRANSFORMATION
11innovation as innovation is a mechanism for destroying the market share of
competitors. Therefore, in practice, patents are characterised by two dimensions:
lifespan,andbreadth.Thesetwodimensionsinﬂuencethedegreeofeﬀectivenessof
patents in encouraging innovation. In addition, enforcement eﬀectiveness and
enforcement speed are issues which aﬀect the impact of patents on innovation.
Therefore, patent eﬀectiveness also relies on eﬀective institutions, and trust in the
institutionsofindividualcountries.Theenergyandtransportsystemtransitionisan
international eﬀort and will rely on institutional strength in multiple countries. Thus,
stronginternationalpatentprotectionmightincreasethenumberofgreeninnovations.
However, strong international patent protection also allows innovators to demand






to innovators and the social beneﬁts of the innovations. This can be done via
government-fundedR&DorviagovernmentsubsidiesforprivateR&D.Asthepositive







Consortiums of members from government, industry, and academia may provide a
way to direct R&D toward industry-applicable solutions. Consortiums, although they
produce more general intellectual property, may be an important avenue for
coordinating eﬀorts and may partially internalise the non-excludable nature of












Recommendation: Government policy should augment investment in R&D for areas
where intellectual property protection is not enough. Consortiums may be useful in





failure sense, is the inability of the market to switch technologies despite the
knowledge that the incumbent technology11 is inferior or undesirable relative to an




11. Path-dependence based on insuﬃcient knowledge at the beginning is not ex-ante ineﬃcient but can be ex-post
ineﬃcient.
BOX1:R&DCONSORTIA
The VLSI (Very Large Scale Integrated circuit) project was designed to help Japan
catchupwithsemiconductortechnology.Theprojectwasconductedbetween1975
and 1985 with a budget of €1.25 billion, of which 22 percent was ﬁnanced by the
government.Itdevelopedstate-of-the-artsemiconductormanufacturingtechnology.
All the major Japanese semiconductor producers participated in this project, and
Japanesesemiconductorcompaniesgainedworldleadershipinthisperiod.Beyond
this anecdotal evidence, it was found that consortia have the eﬀect of stimulating
innovativeactivityintheselectedﬁrms.However,thiscomesatacost.Amongother
components,thesecostsincludetheeﬀectsofreducedcompetition,administrative
burdens on the research personnel of participating ﬁrms, and cost of government
subsidies.
Take-home message: R&D cooperation between competing companies might
stimulateinnovationbutcanhavehighlong-termcost.
Source:Sakakibara(1997).Themarketfailurecanoccurforanumberofreasons:lock-induetouncertainpayoﬀ




the distribution of payoﬀs is unknown. Cowan (1991) develops a model of lock-in
referringtotechnologiesofunknownmeritas‘tortoisesandhares’.Hedemonstrates
that the reduction of uncertainty stemming from the adoption process may lead to
lock-in.Oneillustrativeexampleoflock-induetolearning-about-payoﬀsistheexample
of the two-armed bandit slot machine. Each arm of the slot machine has a diﬀerent
distributionofpayoﬀs.However,overtime,theplayermayconvergeononearmifitis
used more. As the player learns more about the payoﬀ distribution of one arm (the
one which is used more), he refrains from investing money to obtain knowledge on
the payoﬀ distribution of the other arm. Similarly, this analogy can be applied to







may become locked-in. This lock-in is exacerbated over time. Acemoglu et al (2009)
show that even research tends to ‘build on the shoulders of giants’, the giants being
incumbenttechnologies.
Institutionallock-in
A potentially less obvious form of lock-in is institutional and policy lock-in. The
automotiveindustryisanexampleofanindustryforwhichinstitutionallock-inexists.
Both formal and informal private institutions have developed alongside the internal
combustion engine technological system. Knowledge-based institutions, such as
technical schools, developed to train labour for servicing a growing auto network.
Higher-learningdisciplinarydepartmentslikehighwayorautomobileengineeringare
intrinsically linked with the automobile industry. Industry approaches may become
locked-inasa‘curriculum’forlongperiods.Inaddition,unions,industryassociations,
THEGREATTRANSFORMATION
14and media (eg Motor World, Motor Age) have emerged. The existence of specialised
labourforthistechnologycreatesasortoflock-in.
Public institutional lock-in may also occur. Subsidies or government institutions can
havelong-termimpactsandpersistforlongperiodsoftime.Williamson(1998)found
that formal institutions change over decades while informal institutions, such as
cultureornorms,changeovercenturies.Inthecaseoftheautomobileindustry,alarge
networkofinstitutions,includingtheAmericanAutomobileAssociation,theAmerican
Road Builders Association, and National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, formed
alongsidethetechnology;the‘highwaylobby’isstillseenasoneofthemostpowerful
interestgroups(Unruh,2000).Theexistenceofgovernmentinstitutionsspeciﬁctoa
technology might lead to policy biases as the obsolescence of a technology would






than imported coal. Path dependencies exist due to the skill-set of the workforce in
theRuhrValleyofGermany,coupledwithexistingsubsidies.
In general, institutional lock-in has the potential to create non-market forces that
enhance technological lock-in. Institutional policy can override the neo-classical
market forces of competition by removing uncertainty about the direction of
technological development. Firms might then favour a certain technology not in
response to market forces but to institutional ones. Care should be taken to develop




unknown, government support should not be biased toward support for a single
technology.Switchingsupportatalatertimeislesseﬀectiveandmorecostlydueto
learning costs (if no investment or learning was done in the interim), and potential
networkeﬀectsfromtheadoptedtechnology.Thus,priortothecreationofsubsidies
and other institutions, governments should carefully consider their necessity and
determine the ease of shifting from the respective subsidies and institutions in the













be seen as a case of technological lock-in. Initially, there were three competing





there were only two distinct reactor types in the marketplace, and the majority of
reactorsplannedorbuiltwerelightwater.TheUnitedStateshadoriginallydeveloped
light-water reactors for military uses and thus was much-advanced along that
learning curve, compared to the other reactor types, when demand for civilian
nuclear power emerged. Although countries such as Britain and France were
developingtheirowngasgraphitetechnologies,Europeancountries,viatheEuratom
HighCommission,signedanaccordwiththeUS.USsupportforlight-waterreactors
was likely strengthened by the new orders from Europe, and the US provided
ﬁnancialaidandtechnicalassistanttoEurope.TheUS-Euratomaccordevenaﬀected
fuel prices, as prices for enriched uranium were subsidised. Graphite reactors did
notneedenricheduranium,butthisadvantagewasdampenedbytheloweredprices
ofenricheduranium.Althoughtherewasdebatethroughoutthe1970s,development
of nuclear technologies was expensive and both gas graphite and heavy water
presentedtechnicalproblems.TheUKeventuallyadoptedlightwaterasithadbeen
thoroughlydevelopedoutsidetheUK.








with signiﬁcant scale economies and a large number of alternatives will be the most
diﬃcult to replace. Consequently, bringing a new technology to market in such a
system requires that it is either largely compatible with the incumbent system (eg
through hybridisation or the use of adaptors), to beneﬁt from incumbent network
eﬀects,orthatitmanagestoeﬀectivelydeployitsownsystem.
Conclusion: When governments, ﬁrms and consumers must choose between tech-




the winners are unclear, is important. Support may be needed to overcome path
dependencyonestablishednetworks.
1.2.4Coordinationexternality
Any transition from one system to another requires coordination among the
stakeholders. As the energy and transport sector is very capital-intensive, lack of
coordination during the transition is very costly. Standardisation is a primary
coordinationmechanism.AccordingtoSwann(2010),therearefourdiﬀerentpurposes
forstandardisation:compatibility/interfacestandardsandvarietyreductionstandards
are utilised to reduce the fragmentation of a network, and to provide compatibility
requirementsinordertoallowentryintothemarket.Minimumqualitystandardsare
importantinensuringalevelofsafetyforconsumers.Informationstandardsareused
to homogenise information in order to lower information costs (eg for comparing
products).
Thus, standardisation is critical for the development of complex markets. However,
standardisationitselfiscostly,andtheincentivestosponsorstandardisationdonot
naturallyleadtoawelfare-optimalsetofstandards.




17On the other hand, all companies want to avoid a situation in which the adopted
standard locks them out of the market. Due to the high number of stakeholders
involved, and the complexity of the technical questions, complicated negotiations
between stakeholders may emerge. These might take years and consume valuable
resourcesandtime.Consequently,ﬁrst-moverswhoparticipateinthecoordinationof





for a case-study on a failed standardisation eﬀort). Alternatively, in the absence of
otherstakeholdersinthecoordinationprocess,aminorityofengagedcompaniesmay
pushthroughastandardthatisclearlynotinthebestinterestofsociety.Consequently,
public intervention might prove valuable for resolving this market failure. Public
intervention in standardisation should take place when there is a weak, or no,
coordination mechanism between competing companies in a market. Governments
may intervene through administering the standardisation process, and/or through
ﬁnancial subsidies to overcome coordination problems at the R&D stage, and/or to
mitigate the deployment barriers imposed by market competition. Public-private
partnershipsareanotheravenueforfacilitatingcoordination.
It is worth noting that government interests may not necessarily be in line with the
short-term interests of companies active in the standardisation process. The public
sectorputsgreaterimportanceoncustomerinterestsandonthelong-termhealthof








handset technologies and services to their consumers. The ﬁrst cellular data
serviceswereavailableinJapanin1997atextraordinarilylowrates.Cellularphones
arewidelyusedinJapanassubstitutesforﬁnancialinstrumentslikedebitandcredit
cards. Yet despite technical leadership that is often years ahead of foreign
competitors,Japaneseﬁrmshavehadalmostnosuccesssellingintoforeigncellular
deviceandservicemarkets.
As Kushida (2011) explains, the Japanese inability to capitalise on leadership in
networktechnologiesstemsfrombothpublicandprivatedecisions.Domestically,
deviceandservicecompanieswereverticallyintegrated,allowingthemtoresolve
the tension between network and product introduction by internalising the design
anddeploymentofboth.Thisledtoveryearly,highlycompetitivemarketsincellular
data services, perhaps ﬁve years before similar markets emerged in the US and
Europe. But in practice, competition in an isolated market meant that Japanese
productsandnetworkstandardsdivergedfrominternationalnormsinordertodeliver
ever-more-exoticproductstocustomers.
As a result, when Japanese ﬁrms then attempted to take their advanced tech-
nologies abroad, they found they were incompatible with the networks those
marketsdependedon.ItmatteredlittlethatJapanesetechnologywasyearsahead
of the competition. Japan’s failure to keep international standards and domestic
marketsinsynclockeditoutofcapturingexportbeneﬁtsfromitsdomestictechnical
leadership. Like Darwin’s ﬁnches, Japanese cellular ﬁrms were highly adapted to
theirisolatedmarket,butbizarreandstrangecreatureselsewhere.
Take-home message: International coordination and the development of inter-




Source:Kushida(2011).Public intervention may have diﬀerent impacts on standards development. Positive









of certain products. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, investments in
productdevelopmentarenotmadeonthebasisofpotentialbeneﬁtstosociety,but
on the basis of maximal future returns. Therefore, if standards are overly strict,
companies may decide not to develop or produce medicines eﬀective in treating
life-threatening diseases but which do not meet proﬁtability criteria. Excessive
regulatoryburdencanresultinadecreaseorcancellationofR&Dforcertaindrugs.
Inthepast20years,severalcountriesandregions(Australia,theEU,Japanandthe
US), have adopted orphan drug legislation (ODL). Incentives included fast-track
procedures for standardisation and reduced registration fees. This legislation has
beensuccessfulinthepromotionofthedevelopmentofdrugsforrarediseasesor
diseaseswhichareprevalentinpoorercountries.










attempts to set up the world’s ﬁrst high-deﬁnition TV standard. To stimulate early
deploymenttheCommissionmadethedecisiontofavouracertaintechnologyduring





version of HD-MAC. However, it was too late for HD-MAC due to the advance of digital
broadcasting technologies. Public support for TV standardisation has now been
redirectedtowardswidescreenTVstandardscorrespondingtodigitalbroadcasting.
Successcase:GSMstandard





operators to open procurement to foreign manufacturers, and manufacturers to
provide royalty free licenses and to have GSM operational by 1991. This allowed
manufacturers to deliver the new generation of GSM infrastructure equipment in a
timelywayandatreasonablecost.Asaresult,deploymentwasrapid,andgenerated
aﬀordable margins throughout the value chain. This eventually tipped the entire
Europeanandglobalmarkettowardsthestandard.Togetherwiththenextgeneration
UMTS standard, the GSM family of standards eventually captured 89 percent of the
internationalmarket,accordingtothe GlobalMobileSuppliersAssociation.
Take-home message: All stakeholders’ opinions regarding the new technology
standards have to be taken into account. For this purpose, public support should
concentrate strictly on technical problems and avoid politically motivated
preferencesregardingthechoiceofstandard.AnMoUisconsideredagoodtoolfor
bringing all the conﬂicting interests together and ﬁnding a mutually beneﬁcial
frameworkofcooperationtoreducethebarrierstoinvestmentinsidethevaluechain.
Source:Meyer(2010).Public authorities need to ﬁnd the correct balance between socially important
standards(egsafety)andpromotingR&Dinthesector.Itmaybereasonablenottoset
standards too strictly during pre-market development, in order to maintain enough
stimuliforprivateinvestmentinR&D.
Often,withweakornocoordinationmechanismsinplace,iflefttoitsowndevices,the
market produces too little, too much, or standardisation of the wrong sort. However,
public sector involvement is only helpful if properly implemented. Additionally,




may create a positive externality discouraging ﬁrms from entering as ﬁrst-movers.
Fragmentednetworksandmarketsmayarise.
Recommendation: Public intervention into standardisation should take place when
thereareweak,orno,coordinationmechanismsbetweencompetingcompaniesina
market.Publicauthoritiesshouldﬁndtherightbalancewhendeterminingstandards.
Domestic standardisation should take the international standards environment into






shift due to the use of alternative fuels. First-moving infrastructure providers face a
disadvantage because they must pay a large ﬁxed cost in order to establish
infrastructure that is the precondition for the deployment of the appliances. Late-
coming infrastructure providers may beneﬁt from the established network without
having paid the costs of building the network. As latecomers can install the latest
technologyandlargerunitstheyfacelowerservicecost.Thiscost-advantageallows
latecomerstocherry-pickthebestlocationsoncethenetworkandmarkethavebeen









the case of a natural monopoly the presence of an early-mover locks out any
latecomers.Water,gas,telephone,broadbandandelectricitydistributionnetworksare
naturalmonopolies.Consequently,theearly-movercanrecoveranyinitialinvestment
by raising prices when the network has been established. This stimulates rapid











For some network technologies, infrastructure is not a natural monopoly (eg mobile
telecommunication, Facebook), ie multiple infrastructure providers can coexist and
compete for network users. Here, some companies attempt to lock in customers by
creating artiﬁcial barriers (locked SIM cards for mobile phones, non-exportable
contacts in social networks) in order to be able to pay their ﬁxed investments in
network infrastructure14. Technologies that failed to lock in customers (eg email
providers) quickly saw their proﬁt margins drop to zero. Companies that can lock in
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out of their networks. So they invest more. In welfare terms this positive eﬀect is
counteractedbythelong-termnegativeeﬀectsfromhavingamonopoly.
Theconsortiumapproach
Consortiums are another way to help ensure that the investments in network
infrastructure can be recouped. If consortiums can lock out competitors the
consortiums might internalise future beneﬁts of creating a new infrastructure. This
again might stimulate early deployment but may also have undesirable eﬀects on
competition.
Theverticalintegrationapproach
The existence of infrastructure is essential for appliance and service providers.
Consequently,theymightengageinsettinguptheinfrastructurethemselves.Thisis
likesellingcamerabodiescheaplyinordertobeabletodevelopamarketforlenses.









returns. To date much infrastructure (such as roads, railways and electricity
transmission) is provided by government in most European countries. It has to be
noted,however,thattheinitialtechnologychoiceinmanyofthesecases(egrailways)
was left to the market – with governments nationalising the infrastructure only after
itappeared.














to become a ﬁrst-mover, that company needs to work out if the overall rewards
outweightheinitialunderlyingrisks.Sometimes,ﬁrst-moversarerewardedwithhuge




First-movers face risk in both exploring technologies (see section 1.2.2 for further
informationregardingtheinnovationexternality),andindevelopingamarket.Theﬁrst
companies investing in a new technology face signiﬁcant risk, as their business
models are based on uncertain assumptions. If successful, implementation may
quicklybeimitatedbycompetitors.Fallingmarginsmightmakeitimpossibleforaﬁrst-
movertorecoveritsinitialinvestmentatareturnwhichiscommensuratewiththerisks
taken. Followers clearly have some cost advantages of their own. They can, for
example,learnfromthemistakesandsuccessesoftheirpredecessors,reducingtheir
own investment requirements as well as risks. In addition, followers can frequently
adopt new and more eﬃcient processes and technologies, whereas pioneers often





cost disadvantages. Pioneers in consumer goods had an return on investment that













failure for a new technology is privatised, while the beneﬁt is socialised to some
degree,essentiallyleadingtoprivateunderinvestment.Somestrategiesforcompanies
tointernalisethesebeneﬁts(egcoordinationamongstcompetitors,monopolisingthe
new energy technology) raise competition concerns and might not be welfare-
maximisinginthelongterm.
Conclusion:Thecostsofexploring,andbuilding,newmarketsishighandmaynotbe
fully recoverable given that new entrants may reduce proﬁt margins. Due to the
positive externality of business exploration, companies may be reluctant to be ﬁrst-
moversincertainsectors.
Recommendation:Policyshouldaddressthebusinessexplorationexternalitywhere
necessary, providing incentives for the exploration and development of promising
marketsandtechnologies.
1.2.7Insuranceexternality
Energy transitions are inherently subject to a high level of uncertainty. As they are
nationalorglobalshiftsinthewayenergyisproducedandconsumed,theyaresubject
toexogenouseconomic,political,andevengeologicalevents.Energytransitionsare




of transitions have seldom been accurate. For example, in terms of 2008 primary












of two hours as compared with the one hour provided by Betamax. Sony believed
that cassette size and transportability were paramount to the consumer, and
sacriﬁced playing time in order to make smaller cassettes. Simultaneously, JVC





















predicted (Smil 2010). Predictions even over the course of 40 years are not reliable
eventhoughtimehorizonsforenergytransitionsareverylong18.
Despitetheuncertaintyofsuccessforindividualenergytransitions,itisapparentthat
we are currently at the brink of a new era in energy. A drastic change in the way we




It is diﬃcult to know, at the current stage, the cost-eﬀectiveness or feasibility of
diﬀerentgreentechnologies.Earlyperceptionsofnuclearas‘toocheaptometer’have
been incorrect; nuclear is much more expensive than predicted (Cohn, 1997).
Similarly,thecostsofnewtechnologiesmaychangeduetomaterialsavailability(eg
lithium for batteries, platinum for fuel cell membranes) technological constraints
(nuclearfusion)orchangingpublicacceptability(carbonsequestration,nuclear,shale
gas). Attempts to predict aﬀordability have sometimes included the use of learning
curves–savingsincostduetolearning-by-doingandR&D.R&Dinvestmentscreate
steeper learning curves (higher cost savings) but their actual impact is diﬃcult to
measureduetothelackofavailabilityofprivatedata.Learningcurvesmaybeaway
topredictfuturecostsbutareanimperfecttoolasmuchdependsonexternalfactors
unrelated to learning. In addition, technologies may have diﬀerently-sloped curves
andthussometechnologieswhichappearcurrentlyexpensivemaybecheaperinthe
long run, whereas some immediately viable technologies may have learning curves
thatleveloutandwillthusremainexpensive.
AnenergytransitionformitigatingGHGemissionswillrequiredecisionsonbothpublic










discounting method used in the review. However, there is growing concern about the environmental impacts of
GHG emissions, as evidenced by the Kyoto Protocol and the EU 2050 goals, and that there will be a huge cost
incurredbyinaction.behaviour and can occur when there is uncertainty and imperfect information
(Bikhchandanietal,1992).Herdingtoasingletechnologymightmakeitverycostly
forsocietyifthistechnologyprovestobeanineﬃcientorinsuﬃcientsolutiontomeet
emissions targets20. Thus, public intervention to discourage herding and to nurture
alternative technologies, as an insurance against the risky nature of any energy
transition,mightincreaseexpectedwelfare.
Energy security literature asserts that portfolio diversiﬁcation is important in the




a portfolio approach. Investment in a backstop technology may prove to provide a
huge positive insurance externality in the case that the chosen primary technology
fails. The beneﬁts of this externality would not be automatically internalised. This is
anopportunityforthedevelopmentofpolicyinstrumentstoencourageinvestmentin
backstoptechnologies.Althoughitisexpensivetoinvestinthedevelopmentofnew
technologies as an insurance policy, the potential cost savings, in the event that a
backstop technology is needed, are huge and there is risk of substantial cost in not
doingso.
Conclusion: Diversiﬁed investment in alternative technologies may provide an
insurance against failure of primary technologies in meeting the energy and climate
challenge.
Recommendation:Governmentsshouldadoptalong-termperspectiveintechnology















Modern energy and transport systems provide an array of sophisticated services to
industrial economies. At present, it doesn’t appear that a low-emissions transport
system would make substantial improvements to these services. Rather, it seeks to
continuetoprovidethesameserviceswithoutgeneratingthedamagingby-products.
Thustheintroductionofanewtransportsystemdoesnotoﬀertoradicallytransform
an array of economic domains in the way that the introduction of the railways or the













markets traps policymakers between two dilemmas of network selection. Domestic-
ally, the choice of the optimum network may require a lengthy process of experi-
mentationtoguardagainsttherisksofnetworklock-indiscussedabove.Butabroad,
command of export markets requires that states position their industries to sell into
global network standards. Balancing the optimum choice of networks at home with
inﬂuence on global standards and access to export markets abroad becomes the







the creation of a low-emissions energy system can come in two forms. In the initial
phase,thereplacementofsigniﬁcantnetworkinfrastructurecancreatejobsinsectors
such as construction and services. Since these jobs are in non-traded sectors, they
will almost certainly appear. However, they are necessarily time-limited. With the
completionofinfrastructurereplacement,weshouldexpectthelabourdemandsfrom
the energy and transport sector to return to the pre-replacement equilibrium.





States may also wish to keep some or all of the jobs associated with capital goods





to pay those investments back. Likewise, states poorly positioned in the core





both time and space. Most economies will capture jobs in non-traded sectors like
construction as they replace the infrastructure of today’s fossil fuel energy and













can generate signiﬁcant returns. As Box 7 shows, the experience with ‘green’ goods
suchaswindturbineshasshownthataggressivedomesticmarketexpansioninlow-
emissions goods can generate signiﬁcant ‘learning-by-doing’ beneﬁts for domestic
ﬁrms.Inmanyindustries,theonlywaytobecometrulyskilledatdesigning,building
anddeployingnewtechnologicalsystemsistoactuallydesign,buildanddeploythem.
Promoting the domestic growth of low-emissions ﬂeets of technologies such as
hydrogen fuel cell electric vehicles may generate substantial opportunities for
domesticﬁrmstogainvaluableknowledgeabouthownewtechnologiesperformunder
real-worldconditions.Thismaygivethemadvantagesininternationalmarkets,through





inertia. Overcoming that inertia to promote a low-emissions energy and transport
systemmayrequirestatestosupportsimultaneousincreasesinboththedemandfor
low-emissionsenergyandtransportoptionslikehydrogenfuelcellvehiclesandthe
supply of the corresponding network services. But in doing so, states face the




But translating domestic expertise into export-led growth requires very diﬀerent
actions. Access to export markets in network technologies depends on the
compatibility of national ﬁrm products with the network standards chosen abroad.
Signiﬁcant diﬀerences between domestic and foreign choices in this regard may
radically limit the possibility of capturing export beneﬁts through improved ﬁrm
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32competitiveness.Thisisnotanidleconcern.AsBox3shows,Japanhaslonghadfar
more advanced cellular technology than the rest of the world. But early state and
marketincentivesleftJapanwithasuiteofnetworktechnologieswhollyincompatible
with those of its trading partners. Thus despite its technological excellence, Japan




implicit standards-setting authority merely because of the size of their domestic
demand. In this sense, the United States commanded signiﬁcant authority in the
semiconductorandcommunicationsnetworkmarketsnotonlybecauseitwasaﬁrst
moverinthosetechnologies,butalsobecauseitconstitutedthelargestsinglemarket








generations of change in the cellular markets, but Qualcomm has maintained its
revenue stream through both ﬁrst-mover advantage and control over technological
niches. States lacking the size, industrial capacity or political power to shape
















conversely, that governments should simply pick and subsidise a standard without




appears to come down to two important questions of technological, operational and
standardscontrol:
1. Who commands an early lead in fuel cell innovation? Today, most innovation in
fuel cell technologies originates from the US, Canada, Japan and Germany. From
1998-2006, these four countries generated 90 percent of all fuel cell patents
grantedbytheUnitedStatesPatentandTradeOﬃce.
2. Whocommandsanearlyleadinautomotivesystemsintegration?Thestandards-
setting problem is particularly acute at the level of systems integration, where
component technologies are built up into FCEVs. Here, the dominant auto manu-


















as medium-distance goods transport, whose properties allow the deployment of a
morelimited,lessfull-featurednetwork.Thesemarkets,moreover,aretypicallyquite
heavy polluters (given their reliance on heavy diesel fuel), and thus represent





scale. Expanding on those initiatives to include other transportation niches thus
representsanaturalandpromisingpolicydirectionforinformingnetworkchoice.
ButtheEUshouldcontinuetomaintainvigilanceaboutthechallengeofinternational
competition. The problem of state size and international standards-setting would
suggestthattheEUshouldconvergeonasinglestandardforFCEVandpromotethat
standard both domestically – to secure learning-by-doing beneﬁts – and
internationally,tosecureaccesstoexternalmarkets.Butindoingso,itwillfaceintense
competitionfromlargenationalmarketsinChina,JapanandtheUnitedStates.China
in particular has the potential to deploy new vehicle technology much more rapidly
thantheEUorUS,giventheexpectedgrowthofitsvehiclemarketoverthenextseveral





In resolving the tension between domestic and international competitiveness,
however,theEUanditsmemberstatesshouldkeepinmindthatfailurecancomefrom
other sources than unfavourable developments in international standards. The




Furthermore, the rapid development of new domestic sectors may lead to near-term
distortion of labour and capital markets, with negative eﬀects for other high-
productivitysectors.ThegoalofFCEVdevelopmentisnot,ofcourse,thereplacement
but rather the supplementing of employment in sectors with related skills. Pulling
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at a disadvantage, in pursuit of international advantages in highly risky network
technologies.





create internationally competitive ﬁrms does not make that a necessarily optimal
strategy, particularly if it costs the broader economy competitiveness elsewhere.
Capitalising on environmental policy to create economic opportunity and growth





advantage in growing new industries with high value-added. Government support to
establishcorrespondingnewmarketsrequirescostlypolicychoiceswithsigniﬁcant
uncertainty.
Recommendation: In their industrial policy eﬀorts governments should focus on
sectorsweretheycanbuildonpriorstrength.Toidentifypotentialtargets,growingout
ofnichesisarelativelycheapapproachtogatheringinformationontheviabilityofa




targets. Side-beneﬁts such as reduced dependence on fossil fuel imports and lower
local noise and pollution emissions, as well as industrial policy motives make this
transformationevenmorebeneﬁcial.
Becauseofanumberofmarketfailures,privateactorswillnotcarryoutthistransition







Denmark has enormous weight in the global wind power industry. Domestic ﬁrms
suchasVestashaveachievedthiskindofgloballeadershipevenastheyhavebeen
challenged by industrial giants in Germany and the United States. The Danish
experience provides a valuable lesson in translating domestic adoption of low-
emissionstechnologiesintoglobalcomparativeadvantage.
As Heymann (1998) shows, the Danish wind sector had far greater success, far
earlieron,thaneitherAmericanorGermanﬁrms.Furthermore,italsospentlesson
pure research and development. Instead, while both American and German ﬁrms
spenttimeandmoneyonlaboratoryresearchintowindturbinecomponentdesign,
Danishﬁrmsinsteadchosetoactuallygooutandbuildturbines.Inpractice,itturned
out that lab-optimised turbine designs were poorly suited to actual operating
conditions.Bycomparison,Danishﬁrmsmademarginal,continuousimprovements
to their turbines based on real-world data, data unavailable to ﬁrms that had not
startedearlydeployment.
Denmark has continued to capitalise on the process of learning-by-doing. As the
international wind turbine sector has become more competitive, Denmark’s initial
leadhaseroded.ButDenmarkhasnowoneofthefewhigh-wind-energyelectricity
systems, making it an ideal testing ground for the next phase of intermittent
generationtechnologies.Onceagain,ithascapitalisedonitsﬁrst-moverdomestic
statusasalaboratoryforbuildingandoperatingsuccessfulnetworkedsystems.
Take-home message: Aggressive domestic market expansion in low-emissions
goodscangeneratesigniﬁcant‘learning-by-doing’beneﬁts.Inmanyindustries,the








the transport-energy transition, we perform a mapping of current policies to the
externalitiesidentiﬁedinchapter1,inthecontextofapotentialentranttechnology.
We focus on the example of fuel cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) as the potential
breakthrough technology. FCEVs are an interesting case as the transition to such a
technologywouldsuﬀerfrommostoftheimpedimentsdescribedinchapter1.FCEVs
are not competitive against incumbent technologies, for cost reasons, and require
large-scaledownstreamchangestobecomecommerciallyviable.However,FCEVsare




the ‘best’ technology was not and is still not clear). FCEVs still have the potential to
become a breakthrough low-carbon transport technology, among several others.
Additionally, FCEVs are more sensitive to the infrastructure externality and path
dependenciesthantechnologiessuchasbatteryelectricvehicles(BEVs),andwould
serve better for illustrating the problems faced by similarly infrastructure-sensitive
technologies23. We will examine how current policies may support or hinder a




















4. Consumer acceptance (willingness to pay the diﬀerence with established tech-
nologies,marketsharepotential).
Furthermore, analysis of the literature delivered insights into the interdependencies
of the factors. For example, the cost development of the propulsion technology will
haveavitalimpactonconsumeracceptanceofFCEVsandtheachievablefuturemarket
share. The number of cars sold and produced has an impact on how quickly scale
economiesandlearning-by-doingeﬀectsleadtocostreductions.However,themarket
share achieved has an impact on the proﬁtability and supply of fuel station infra-
structure, and the supply of infrastructure, in turn, has an impact on the purchase













































































































fuel cell electric vehicles to become a successful technology and (2) how much of
these will the market provide autonomously in the business-as-usual case without
policy intervention? To answer those questions we use a model based approach. It
utilisestheMarketModelElectricMobility(MMEM)–asimulationtooldevelopedbythe
EuropeanSchoolofManagementandTechnology(ESMT,2011).Whiletheunderlying
assumptions are based on the German car market, the results can generally be
transferred to the European context (see the Appendix for more information on the
modellingapproach).
Speciﬁcally,toanswerthetwokeyquestions,wesimulatedthefollowingscenarios:
1. The ‘industry forecast scenario’ in which we simulate a world where the main
inputs such as FCEV production costs, hydrogen costs and infrastructure supply
take the values of the industry forecasts made in McKinsey & Company (2010)
report, A portfolio of power-trains for Europe: a fact-based analysis.W et h e n
estimate the achievable market shares where all the targets and milestones are
met,inlinewiththerequirementsstatedbythestakeholders.
2. However,meetingthetargetsfromtheMcKinsey&Company(2010)studyisbyno
means assured and depends on a number of factors. Therefore, in comparison to








stations can be operated proﬁtably given the number FCEVs on the market. The
numberofchargingstations,inturn,shouldinﬂuencecarbuyers’willingnesstopay
and, therefore, the market share achievable. These interdependencies are
implementedinMMEM,themodelusedtosimulatethetwoscenarios.
To provide a quick overview, Table 1 summarises the assumptions made, and
approachesused,inthetwoscenarios.
Table1:ComparisonBAUandindustryforecastscenarioapproachandassumptions
Indicator BAUmodellingapproach Industryforecast scenario
2020 2030
Hydrogenfuelproductioncosts[€/kg] Two-Factor-Learningcurveapproach -4.5 -4.0
Hydrogenvehiclecost Two-Factor-Learningcurveapproach -29 -25
components[€1000s/vehicle]
Infrastructuresupply[%stationdensity] Break-Even-Model -1.5% 9%
Source:ESMT(2011),McKinsey&Company(2010).
For each of the factors identiﬁed, we ﬁrst deﬁne the industry forecast scenario – ie
what targets and milestones need to be met based on the literature review and
stakeholderviews.Secondly,wemodeltheBAUscenariotoderiveanestimateofhow
muchdevelopmentislikelytooccurwithoutanypolicyintervention.Anydiscrepan-
cies between the two scenarios can be interpreted as the technological-commercial











































43Common characteristics of these components are their complexity and novelty. The
technology is as yet untested, and produced in low numbers in unautomated
processes. Consequently, it is expensive. In order to present a viable alternative





needed to lower production costs via technological advancement. Given the
importanceofkeycomponentcostdevelopmenttothecommercialsuccessofFCEVs,
theevolutionofcostsneedstobetrackedcloselyviasuitableindicators.Thefollowing








2010 2015 2020 2030
HyWays(2008) n/a n/a 100 50
Blesletal(2009) 600 n/a 150 40
IndustryForecast 500 110 43 43
Sources:Blesletal(2009),Roads2HyCom(2009),McKinsey&Company(2010).
While the available forecasts are conﬂicting regarding the extent and speed of the
achievablecostreduction,thestudiesreviewedallexpectthatcostscouldfallto€40-
50perkilowattinthemediumtermiffuel-cellsystemsareproducedonanindustrial
scale24 (see Table 2). This would represent an almost 90 percent decline in the
productioncostsoffuel-cellstacks.
A second cost component and success factor for FCEVs is the production cost of the
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24. ForaninformativereviewofcostdevelopmentseeforexampleBlesletal(2009).hydrogen tank. Indeed, given the low mass-energy ratio and transient nature of
hydrogen fuel, storing a suﬃcient amount of it presents a signiﬁcant technical
challenge (Roads2HyCom, 2009). Only 700 bar tanks would provide the storage
capacityneededforFCEVstoexceedrangesof300kilometresperreﬁll.Thecostsof
energy-storage systems are still very high and need to be reduced through invest-
ments in research and through learning-by-doing eﬀects. Reﬂecting technical
uncertainties, forecasts of cost developments in the literature are vague. Blesl et al
(2009) suggest current production costs of around €775 per kg tank capacity and
consideracostdeclineto€270realistic.Weusethisforecastasourbenchmarkforthe
requiredcostdeclineforhydrogentanks.
Other relevant cost components of FCEVs, which need to come down in order for the
purchase price to become competitive against competing propulsion technologies,
are the costs of the electric engines, control electronics and battery costs. These
componentsarecommontootherelectricpropulsiontechnologiesandonecanexpect
spillovereﬀectsfromacommercialdeploymentofplug-inhybrid,rangeextenderand
battery electric vehicles. Indeed, with mild hybrid cars already being produced in
signiﬁcant numbers, cost reductions in this area have already taken place and are
likelytocontinuewellaheadofthoseofactualfuelcellcomponents.Weexpectbattery
costtofallsigniﬁcantlyfromthe€700-800perkWhtobelow€300perkWhoverthe
next decade, reﬂecting the increasing market share of electric vehicles and invest-
ments in research and development. This is based on expectations from battery
industrystakeholdersexpressedduringthe‘NationalPlatformElectricmobility(NPE)’
consultation process conducted in Germany in 2010 and 2011 (Nationale Plattform
Elektromobilität,2010).Wewillusethisforecastasourindustryforecastscenariofor
batterycostdevelopment.
C ancostreduct ionsbeachievedint heBAUcase?
Costreductionsonthescalerequiredtomeetthetargetsexpressedbyindustryand
literature can only be achieved through substantial investments in new production
andmaterialtechnologies.Furthermore,onlyproductiononanindustrialscaleislikely
to achieve the learning-by-doing eﬀects required. We therefore modelled the extent
of cost reductions possible in diﬀerent scenarios, in order to identify whether cost-
reductiontargetscanbeachieved.Themodelisbasedonatwo-factor-learning-curve
approachforestimatinghowcostswilldevelopinresponsetoincreasingproduction
capacity and accumulated learning (see Box 8). The cost decline of the FCEV
components determines the actual purchase prices of hydrogen vehicles and their
competitiveness.Thefeedbackloopbetweenmarketuptakeandlearning-by-doingis
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Understanding the future technical progress of innovations is crucial when
discussing the prospects of innovative propulsion technologies. In the context of
FCEVs, innovation theory, using learning curves, can shed light on the technical
changeprocessandtheimpactonunitcosts.Theconceptoflearningasadistinct
sourceoftechnicalchangewaspresentedinWright(1936)andArrow(1962),and
is often called learning-by doing. Technical change through learning eﬀects is
generallyderivedfromlearningcurves.Progressistypicallymeasuredintermsof






With Qt denoting cumulative production in the current period, Rt cumulative
research expenditure, C the unit costs, and ε the share of non-learning cost (for
example raw materials). αt and βt are the learning-by-doing and learning-by-


























Clearly, the underlying assumptions about learning rates (and initial production
experience)haveasigniﬁcantimpactonthetrajectoryofthelearningcurveandthe
costreductionsthatcanbeachievedwithincreasingmarketpenetration.Alearning




The model results suggest that, in the business as usual scenario, the costs of the
main components will not decline as quickly as required to meet stated targets and
milestones.Thisistheresultofthecombinedeﬀectoflowmarketpenetrationanda











in the medium term. This is not surprising as the cost reductions are unlikely to be
achieved through capacity increases alone. As the example in Box 8 shows, R&D-






of the technology. Current prototypes are being produced manually, leading to very




medium term. It is uncertain though if the market will autonomously reach the cost
reductions required. In particular, there is a large gap between target costs and the
costoutcomesintheBAUcase,suggestingthatthetargetswillbemissed.Giventhe
overall cost share of this component, the gap will signiﬁcantly impact the purchase
price of FCEVs, and may impede the market-share growth of the technology. Our
analysissuggeststhatreducingthecostsinlinewithindustryforecastswouldrequire
aconcertedapproach.T able4:Costdevelopmentofkeycomponent:summaryofsuccessf act orsand
suggestedprogressindicators




Purchaseprice[€1000s] 113 29 25 31 24%
FCstackcosts[€/kw] 367 98 44 125 182%
Batterycosts[€/kwh] 871 300 260 260 0%
H2tankcosts[€/kg] 775 270 300 11%
Source:Bruegel/ESMT.
2.1.4Productioninfrastructure:hydrogenproductioncost
Although the hydrogen distribution infrastructure is still in its infancy, a hydrogen
productioninfrastructurealreadyexists.Thus,anextensionofexistingcapacitiescould
beutilisedtoprovidehydrogenintheinitialphaseoftheFCEVdeployment.
C urrentsit uat ionandconsensusf orecastf orhydr ogencost sdevelopment
Hydrogenproductioncostsdependonthemixofproductiontechnologiesemployed
(see Table 5). While currently mostly a side product of other processes, some cost
reductioncanbeachievedwhenhydrogenisproducedonanindustrialscale.Falling
equipment costs of decentralised production facilities will also add to the cost
reduction potential. However, the cost decline from increasing the output of con-
ventionalproductionmethodsmaybepartlyoﬀsetbyincreasedcostsasproduction
moves towards sustainable and decentralised production methods. Indeed, there
seems to be a targets conﬂict between reducing the carbon emissions of hydrogen
productionandachievinglowproductioncosts.
Table5:Productioncostforselectedproductionmethods
Coal Coal Gas Biofuel
steaming CCS reforming reforming Electrolysis
Costs[EUR/GJ] 4.4-7.5 4.9-14.3 5.6-21.8 10.4-21.2 11.4-22.7





25. The learning-by-doing cost regression coeﬃcient expresses the cost decline that can be achieved with each
doublingofcumulatedproductionexperience.







Row Labels 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
HyWays(2008) n/a 4.0 3.0
TheConnecticutCenterfor n/a 3.0 2.9 2.8 2.8
AdvancedTechnologyInc.(2011)
McKinsey&Company(2010)* 4.5 4.5 4.0 4.0 3.8
Source:Roads2HyCom(2009),McKinsey&Company(2010),TheConnecticutCenterforAdvancedTechnology,Inc.
(2011).Note:*excludingtransportandretailmargin.
To simulate the interdependence between consumer choice, market uptake and
hydrogenfuelcosts,weagainuseatwo-factor-learning-curveapproach(describedin
Box 8). Unlike the fuel cell vehicle component costs, however, the level of hydrogen
fuel cost reduction achieved via learning-by-doing is expected to be considerably
lower. This is partly due to the fact that production methods used for hydrogen are
already well established. With decades of experience with some of the methods of
currentproduction,costsarelikelytobeonamuchlowerpointofthelearningcurve.
McKinsey&Company(2010)suggestsalearningratebetween3-7percent,whichis




in increasing the share of low emission production methods while keeping
productioncostslow.
2.1.5Retaildistributioninfrastructure:networkdensity
With little indication of a policy gap with respect to the actual production costs,
attention moves towards providing an adequate retail infrastructure for FCEVs –speciﬁcally,thetrade-oﬀbetweenlowhydrogenfuelretailpricesandtheproﬁtability




Similar to conventional vehicles, FCEVs require a dedicated reﬁlling infrastructure.
Suﬃcient network density is a pivotal factor for the successful market adoption of
hydrogen vehicles. As such, a suﬃcient minimum infrastructure will have to be
provided in parallel to the commercial launch of FCEVs. However, with the number of
userslikelytobelowintheearlystagesofmarketdeployment,theproﬁtableprovision




A lack of infrastructure reduces the utility of vehicles as users are faced with
uncertainty, search costs, and the need to calculate detours in order to refuel their
cars.Consequently,carbuyersvaluedensenetworksofrefuellingstationsandwould
chooseapropulsiontechnologywithahighnetworkdensityoveranalternativewith
low density, ceteris paribus. However, determining the actual utility of refuelling
stations is less conclusive. Often, the existence of refuelling stations for emerging
alternativevehiclesismeasuredbycalculatingthenetworkdensity–theshareofthe
existingrefuellingnetworkoﬀeringthealternativefuel.
In Achtnicht et al (2008), and Ziegler (2009), the marginal utility of refuelling is a
constant and their models exhibit a very strong eﬀect from these variables. The
calculatedwillingnesstopayrangesfrom€200-300foreachpercentnetworkdensity.
However, a limitation of these results is that they rely on a constant marginal









There is a trade-oﬀ between the cost of providing suﬃcient infrastructure and the







Source 2015 2020 2025 2030 2050
HyWays(2008) 0.9 10.0 20.0
Industryforecast 0.8 2.3 5.1 18.2
Source:McKinsey&Company(2010),Roads2HyCom(2009).
Infrastructuresupply:howmuchinfrastructurewillbeprovidedbythemarket?
Currently, the number of refuelling stations available in Europe is limited to a low
numberofdemonstrationsites.Thisreﬂectsthepre-commercialisationphaseofthe
26. Estimatebasedonaround60,000conventionalrefuellingstationsinEurope.technology. Taken together, the number of stations does not exceed 100 – this




determined by the size of the hydrogen vehicle ﬂeet. Consumer acceptance of the
technologyis,inturn,inﬂuencedbytheexistenceofadequatenetworkdensity.This
negativefeedbackloopcanleadtoanunder-provisionofinfrastructureinthemarket,
especially if future demand is uncertain. To model this interdependency, a simple
break-even modelling approach was used. The break-even model estimates the
number of charging stations that can be proﬁtably operated for a given number of
FCEVs in the vehicle stock, the current equipment costs, and the retail margins of
hydrogenrefuellingstations.








Unsurprisingly, using these assumptions indicates that in the BAU scenario, the
numberofchargingstationsproﬁtablyprovidedbythemarketwillremainsigniﬁcantly
belowtheconsensustarget.Thisreﬂectstheaforementionednegativefeedbackloop
between a sluggish up-take and hence low demand for hydrogen fuel, and low
willingness to pay for hydrogen cars due to the lack of infrastructure (see Table 7).
However, even a scenario where the market penetration targets are met may see an
insuﬃcientnumberoffuelstationsprovidedintheshortandmediumterm.
Clearly, such a straightforward break-even analysis suﬀers from a number of short-
comings. For example, it neglects investor expectations regarding the future
developmentofdemand.Investorsmaytoleratelossesintheearlycommercialisation
phase hoping that these would be compensated as soon as the market for FCEVs
evolves. This notion supports the view that transparent policy objectives and clear






inhibiting market uptake, and hence infrastructure demand, when expectations are







need to be equipped with hydrogen refuelling facilities. Considering the proﬁtability of
suchinfrastructure,thereisastronglikelihoodthatthemarketwillnotprovideanadequate
numberofhydrogenrefuellingstationsintheshortandmediumterm.Thiscouldleadto
a negative feedback loop between FCEV demand and fuel station provision, resulting in
thetechnologymissingthedeploymenttargetsenvisionedbytheindustry.
Inadditiontoadequateproductionandretailinfrastructure,amass-marketrolloutof
hydrogen vehicles would require a suitable and cost-eﬀective transmission infra-
structure to link retail and production sites. Unlike other infrastructure components,
therearecurrentlyalreadyseveralviabletransportoptionsavailable.Indeed,pipelinetransport of hydrogen has been used for more than 50 years. Existing pipeline
networksforindustrialuseinBelgiumandNorthernFrance(morethan1000km)could
formthebasisforfuturenetworkextensions(Blesletal,2009).
Truck and trailer-based transport provides a ﬂexible and economically viable option
fortransportinghydrogen.Forexample,compressedgas-tubetrailertruckscouldbe
used–especiallyfordistancesunder200km,andinregionswherelowdemandwould
not justify a dedicated pipeline infrastructure. However, the actual mix of transport




of adequate and cost-eﬀective production capacity with a hydrogen production cost
targetofaround€4/kginthemediumterm.Thechallengehereseemstobeincreasing
the share of low emission production techniques while keeping production costs at
an aﬀordable level. This would require both a suﬃcient scale of demand and
investmentinR&D,toreduceproductioncostsfornewdecentralisedfacilities.
Another prerequisite for a mass market launch is the existence of a basic retail
infrastructure(roughly10percentnetworkdensity).Thereisindicationthat,especially
in the early stages of market development, suﬃcient density cannot be provided
proﬁtably.Suﬃcientdensitymightonlybeprovidedwithhighretailfuelcostsaslow
utility rates would lead to excessive retail margins. Table 9 summarises the main
infrastructureandfuelsuccessfactorswiththeirindicators.
Table9:Infrastructureandfuelfactorsandrelevantindicators
Progressindicators Status Industry Industry BAU Gap
quo forecast forecast Scenario
scenario scenario 2030
2020 2030
Numberofrefuellingstations 0 5.4 12.55 0.6 -95%
[thousandunits]
Networkdensity[Shareof 0 9 21 1 -95%
existingfuelstations]






Only the combination of suitable infrastructure with a competitive propulsion
technology will make FCEV a success. Based on the factors identiﬁed above, we ask
how certain outcomes of those indicators will aﬀect acceptance among consumers.
Consumer acceptance will be measured by estimating the willingness-to-pay
diﬀerence to established technologies, and the actual market share of new
registrations which can be expected. The results are derived using the Market Model
ElectricMobility(MMEM).Initially,wewillmodeltheoutcomesoftheindustryforecast






will meet their targets and milestones (see section 2.1.1). In this case, the a-priori
expectationwouldbetoseeFCEVsgainingcompetitivenessinthemediumtermand
becoming a comparable technology option in the long run. To investigate how
competitivenessdevelopswhenthetargetsarereached,weestimatethewillingness-
to-pay gap compared to a conventional diesel engine. The willingness-to-pay gap
expresseshowmuchmoreorlessaconsumeriswillingtopayforvehiclescompared
toatypicaldieselcar.AsFigure7shows,ifthetargetsaremet,FCEVscanquicklygain
in competitiveness. However, even based on this optimistic scenario, hydrogen
vehicleswillonlybeperceivedasanequaloptionafter2040.
Thisisalsoreﬂectedintheactualmarketshareforecastforthediﬀerenttechnologies
shown in Figure 8 (the orange shaded area shows the market share development of
hydrogen vehicles). Following their commercial launch in 2015, it will take until the
mid-2030s for the technology to gain a signiﬁcant market share. Further ahead, we
wouldexpectamarketshareofaround25percentin2050ifthefactortargetsaremet.
Thus, the modelling results of Figure 8 are in line with the prediction of McKinsey &
Company (2010) that FCEV can achieve a market share of about 25 percent if the
industryforecastsonallkeyfactorsmaterialise.Clearly,giventhetimehorizonofthe
forecast, and the uncertainty regarding the development of the inputs, there is a























assumptions. The BAU assumes a complete absence of autonomous research and
developmentinvestmentaswellasnochangeinmobilityandenergytaxationpolicies,
reﬂecting the policy status of 2011. However, while conservative, it is our view that
the business as usual case describes a realistic scenario. Indeed, our analysis
indicates that a concerted eﬀort will be required for hydrogen vehicles to achievecompetitiveness. If that is not the case, a negative feedback loop and mutual
ampliﬁcation between the key factors leads to the technology remaining a niche
product. Additionally, the nature, scope and timing of measures taken can have a
signiﬁcantimpactonthemarketadoptiontrajectoryofthetechnology.
Finally, this raises the question of how some of the shortcomings which lead to the




• Scenario 2: Infrastructure build-up to increase infrastructure deployment to the
levelofindustryforecast;
• Scenario 3: Carbon pricing – inclusion of the car industry in the EU Emissions
Trading System, which would see manufacturers having to obtain emission
certiﬁcates for the estimated life time emissions of each vehicle sold. This would
increase the purchase costs of high-emitting technologies and improve the
competivenessoflow-emissiontechnologiessuchasFCEVs27.
• Scenario 4: The scenario that all measures described above will be employed
together.
Figure 10 shows the results of the simulation exercises. Applied without any other
measures, R&D funding is the only instrument likely to increase market uptake
















is likely to lead to any signiﬁcant increase in the market share of FCEVs in the
foreseeablefuture.Employingapackagethatwouldcombineinfrastructuresupport,
R&D funding, and ETS inclusion is likely to lead to a market share approaching 14
percent in 2050 (scenario 4, blue line). While this is still below the industry forecast
scenario of 25 percent in 2050 (orange line), it would serve to establish FCEVs as a
massmarkettechnologyintheforeseeablefuture.
Figure 11 indicates that the stronger deployment of hydrogen cars in the industry
forecast scenario, as compared to the concerted approach, crowds out some of the











Due to the absence of an international climate agreement beyond 2013, there is
currently no global long-term carbon price signal. Fuel taxes for fossil fuels and, in
somecountries,roadtollsarepartiallyinternalisingsomeofthenegativeexternalities
ofroadtransportemissions.However,thesetaxes/tollsaresupposedtocorrectmany







In contrast to conventional fuels, hydrogen and electricity currently do not pay fuel
taxesinmostmemberstates.However,electricityconsumption(egfortheproduction















• Energy content component => €9.6 per gigajoule for motor fuel and €0.15 per
gigajouleforheatingfuels
For incentivising car manufacturers to conduct long-term investments in low-carbon
vehicles, the EU has devised a vehicle ﬂeet emission standard28. Based on this
standard,eachmanufacturerhastoensurethattheaverageemissionsperkilometre
of all cars he sells in Europe are below a certain threshold. Currently, EU Regulation
(EC)No443/200929setsatargetvalueof130grammesCO2perkilometre[gCO2/km]
by2015andof95gCO2/kmby2020fornewpassengercars.Thetargetisgradually













driving decisions to the need for emission reductions. As alternative fuels such as
hydrogen and electricity fall under the ETS, these technologies are put at a dis-
advantage with respect to conventional fuels. Consequently, a consistent approach
towards including the transport sector in an economy-wide emission reduction is
missing.
2.3.2Innovationexternality
Individual ﬁrms under-invest in R&D because they do not fully internalise the social
beneﬁtsofR&Dinvestments.Patentprotection,publicR&Daswellasﬁnancialsupport
toprivateR&Darethemostprominenttoolstoresolvetheinnovationexternality.While




public support – make the issue of technology choice for public funding even more
pressing. At some point in the realisation of an energy transition, government must
make a choice over competing technologies. Public budgets are limited and, thus,
equalﬁnancialsupporttoovercomemarketfailuresforalltechnologiesmightleadto
underfundingforallalternatives.Intheworstcase,allcleantechnologiesthenfailto
become competitive. With a constrained budget, supporting some promising
technologies at the right level might be superior to complete technology-neutrality




Support schemes for encouraging R&D exist at the regional, member state and EU


















and for the diﬀerent parts. The assessments are conducted by experts groups from
therespectiveﬁelds,thoughtheyareledandfacilitatedbytheEuropeanCommission’s
DirectorateGeneralforEnergy.
Part of the SET plan established consortia (bringing together industry, the research
community,andtheCommissioninpublic-privatepartnerships).Theestablishmentof




and private sources. The scheme calls for 50-50 cost-sharing and facilitates







It has €1.4 billion in total budget for the period 2007-16. Half of this comes from the
FederalMinistryofEconomicsandTechnology,andtheFederalMinistryofTransport,
BuildingandUrbanAﬀairs;andhalfcomesfromindustry.
Regional support for hydrogen and fuel cells also exists. For example, the Flemish
governmentfundsR&DviatheIWT-VlaanderenandtheFWO-Vlaanderen.Thesechannel
30. The technology platforms are formalised into six European Industrial Initiatives (EII) and one Joint Technology
Initiative(JTI).public R&D funds to both industries and universities. The regional support takes a
bottom-up approach, although some participation in larger programmes also takes
place.
SupportprogrammesinEuropetoencourageinnovationentaileitherdirectﬁnancial










The Top Runner Programme is aimed at increasing energy eﬃciency via the
establishmentofstandards.Theprogrammeisiterative,andcoversawidevariety
of products, including gasoline, diesel, and LPG passenger vehicles. Regulators
iterativelytesttheavailableproductsinthemarketforuse-phaseenergyeﬃciency,
and set as the new standard the energy-eﬃciency of the ‘top-runner’ product.
Energy-eﬃciency standards also take technical potential into consideration and
complianceisevaluatedbythecorporateaverage.
The programme itself goes through multiple revisions, addressing the scope of
covered products (eg phase-out of cathode-ray tube television sets). It avoids the
implicationsofitsstringentstandardsontradeasmostproductscoveredarelargely
suppliedbytheinternalmarket.Standardsandtargetdatesaresetcollaboratively




to the US CAFE programme or the EU vehicle ﬂeet emission standards). Ideal fuel
eﬃciencyhasbeenimprovedduetothefueleﬃciencyimprovementofnewcars.
Real running fuel eﬃciency has also been improved since the introduction of Top
Runner. There was a 22.8 percent improvement in fuel eﬃciency for gasoline







by manufacturers onto consumers, although consumers may be expected to
recoupthecoststhroughsavingsinenergy.Itscosttopublicfundsislow.
• There is a danger (due to evidenced over-compliance) that standards set may
alreadybeachievablewithproductsnotonthemarket.Therefore,thispolicymay
notactuallybespurringtechnologicalinnovations.Inaddition,careneedstobe
taken in deﬁning product categories such that the standards do not stiﬂe
competition.
Policyimplications:
• Adoption in Europe would require alterations to the Japanese Top Runner






• The potential pitfall of the collaborative approach and the use of benchmarking
maybealackofincentivetosethighenoughbenchmarksoralackofincentive
to be the top-runner (eg when the market is small, it may be easier for a ﬁrm to
waitbeforereleasingtechnologytothemarketwhichmeetsanewstandard).











Japan 0.297 0.99 0.72
US 0.159 0.87 0.33
Germany 0.152 1.05 0.28
Korea 0.056 1.21 0.82
France 0.039 0.7 0.26
UK 0.036 0.98 0.28
EU 0.32 1.01 0.25
BRICs
China 0.009 1.11 0.36
India 0.003 1.44 0.45
Russia 0.002 1.11 0.27
Brazil 0.002 1.51 0.41
Source:Veugelers(2011)31.
Thus, more incentives for innovation and more targeted incentives for ‘green’
innovationareessential.
Howcanthecurrenttechnologychoicemethodologybeimproved?
Although the current method for determining technology choice is iterative,
consensus-building, and focused on the long-term, support is fragmented between
technologies. There is no consensus-building amongst regions, member states and
the EU. International coordination is also currently lacking. As the process is
fragmented and decentralised, there is currently no overall portfolio or technology
view. Additionally, support for individual technologies is determined largely on
THEGREATTRANSFORMATION
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31. Source: Bruegel based on UNEP/EPO/ICTSD (2010). Note: Patents are counted on the basis of claimed priorities
(patentapplicationsﬁledinothercountriesbasedontheﬁrstﬁledpatentforaparticularinvention).ATop6country
has at least two percent of world clean-energy technology patents; together the Top 6 represent 74 percent of
world clean-energy technology patents. RTA = share of the country in world clean-energy technology patents




for industry to provide over-optimistic information are great as, by providing over-
optimisticprojections,industrymayobtainadditionalfundsanddelaylossesontheir
investments. Although JTIs are important for avoiding oscillations in enthusiasm for
diﬀerent technologies (fads), they may also create some institutional inertia32.
Althoughinitiativesandpackagesaresubjecttomid-termreviews,theseareperformed
by industry experts. Expert industry-speciﬁc knowledge is required for proper
assessment of technology progress, but experts may also be biased toward
technologiesintheirﬁeld.Forexample,scientistsworkingwithnuclearmaygenerally
beinfavourofnuclear.
Most importantly, there is not enough transparency as regards to the technology-
choicemechanism.TheEuropeanCommissionhaspublishedatransportwhitepaper
asaroadmaptoasingleEuropeantransportationarea.Althoughitincludesmodelling
of diﬀerent scenarios, it does not include a transparent technological choice







A major obstacle for the deployment of vehicles propelled by alternative fuels is the
absence of a corresponding refuelling/recharging infrastructure. For example, ﬁnal
consumerswillonlyacceptFCEVsifasuﬃcientlydensenetworkofhydrogenfuelling
stations exists. The value proposition of FCEVs (as compared to battery electric
vehicles) is to replace conventional cars in terms of range implies that all European
destinations within reach of a fossil fuelled car should essentially be accessible by
FCEVsaswell.Thushydrogenfuelstationswillatsomepointhavetocovertheentire
Europeanmarket.Figure12summarisesthenumberofexistinghydrogenrefuelling







As the deployment of hydrogen fuelling stations is not yet commercial due to the
absence of FCEVs, the majority of existing stations is based on bottom-up initiatives
fromdiﬀerentdemonstrationprojects.Thoseareconcentratedinparticularcountries,









was initiated by Daimler and Linde, assembling a group of companies for
addressing the infrastructure issue in terms of developing uniﬁed fuel station
standards, costs and risks sharing between private and public sectors and
appropriatepolicysupportinstruments.
THEGREATTRANSFORMATION
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initiative constitutes a transnational networking platform that catalyses and






The ‘Clean Energy Partnership’ is the largest hydrogen demonstration project in
Europe. Moreover, through the National Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology
Innovation Programme (NIP) Germany has developed the most ambitious FCEV




development of Zero Emission Vehicles (Box 10). Additionally, the example of the
Japanesedemonstrationprogrammeprovidespossiblemethodstoencouragegreater
involvementofindustryinthedemonstrationandtestingphases(Box11).Germany











The ZEV regulation requires that a manufacturer maintain a certain percentage of
ZEVcertiﬁedvehiclesinthevehiclesdeliveredforsaleinCalifornia.For2012-14this
is 12 percent and 15 percent for 2015-17 Zero and Partial Zero Emission Vehicles.
The pure ZEV requirements were 2.5 percent for 2009-11, 3 percent for 2012-14,
and4percentfor2015-17.Onlylarge-volumemanufacturersaresubjecttotheZEV
requirements, while intermediate-volume manufacturers can meet requirementsTHEGREATTRANSFORMATION
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case other approaches fail to result in suﬃcient infrastructure. It is currently
triggered at 20,000 vehicles of a particular type of clean fuel in California.
Noncompliance results in ﬁnes – if owners of outlets fail to equip the required
number,theyareﬁned$500/carfortheﬁrst10carsfuelledwithgasolineeachday
oftheviolation;iftheownersfailtoprovidecleanfuelsataspeciﬁcoutlet,orfailsto






standard to a ﬂeet average GHG requirement (like the federal or the European
approach) and (ii) taking into account and standardising the upstream GHG
emissioncalculations.
• Reliable estimates of the implicit economic cost of the CFO and the ZEV are not
available.
Policyimplications:
• The Zero Emission Vehicle programme provides a framework for ensuring a
minimumnumberofzeroemissionvehicles.
• The Clean Fuel Outlet programme is a regulatory approach to solve the
infrastructure externality in a technology neutral way. A ﬁnal evaluation of this






‘Hydrogen Infrastructures Demonstration Study’. This research was subsidised by
theMinistryofEconomy,TradeandIndustry.Theprojecthadalargerbudgetthanthe
USFreedomCarprogrammesandtheUSHydrogenFuelInitiativecombined.
Fleet testing was conducted by third-parties – including Mercedes-Benz Japan,
Nissan, Honda and Toyota. Demonstration data were used by the Japanese
Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Demonstration Project to conduct environmental impact
studies. Furthermore the project analysed technology and policy trends, and
developedpublicrelationsandeducationstrategies.
Comparisonwithotherdemonstrationprojects:






the US, greater than Europe. Data collection was largest in the US but limited in
bothJapanandEurope;
• JHFC saw the largest participation of global automakers and Japanese
infrastructure companies. In the US it was mostly US automakers and no
Japanese automakers. In Europe it was mostly European automakers and this
hadthefewestparticipants.Severalkeyenergycompaniesalsoparticipatedin






US and Europe. As Japan as a region covers a smaller geographic area, theirTHEGREATTRANSFORMATION
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Publicsupportgap
Currently, the national and European initiatives for early-market deployment of
hydrogen fuelling stations are not coordinated in terms of timeframe, stakeholders,
areas to be covered, standards, and roll-out plan. EU level (HyWays), regional
(Scandinavian Hydrogen Highway Partnership) and member state initiatives (eg
Germany,Denmark)aretoosmallinscopetogiveclearsignalsforaregional,letalone
European, infrastructure expansion. The idiosyncratic projects lack a general
framework.Thus,acomparativeevaluationisnotpossible.
2.3.4Othermarketfailuresaddressedbycurrentpolicies
Other externalities introduced in the ﬁrst chapter are also partially addressed by





Technology Initiatives. The Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking facilitates
coordinationbetweenindustry,government,andacademia.Theinter-industrynature
of fuel cell electric vehicles, involving car manufacturers, the chemical industry,
utilities and electricity production, and the information technology industry, further
highlightstherequirementforcoordinationamongthediﬀerentplayers.Oneaspectof
this policy area is the development of technical and safety standards. Here, binding
and transparent guidelines are required to alleviate concerns amongst consumers
regarding the safety of FCEVs in everyday use. Currently, there is no mechanism for
facilitating the coordination of EU-level standards, let alone international ones. One
exceptionisthelabellingdirectiveoftheEU,whichhelpscompaniestocoordinateon
informationstandardsimportantforcreatingconsumeracceptance.














to explore green transport technology markets such as hydrogen FCEV. Public








(such as nitrogen oxides, volatile organic compounds, ozone particles and sulphur
oxides), and less noise. Thus, they already comply with the strictest European
emission standards that will enter into force in 2013-15 (the so-called Euro VI
standards). In addition, various regional laws have targeted pollution directly. For
example, German environmental zoning legislation in some cities prohibits certain
typesofcarsfromenteringareasofthecity.Theaimofthislegislationistoimproveair
quality. In many countries, speed limits have been put in place partially to combat
noise pollution. Although these regional policies exist, they are fragmented and not
economically-minded.
In contrast to renewable energy technologies, the deployment of FCEVs is currently




33. Vehicles with CO2 emissions below 50 g/km receive super-credits. Each such vehicle is counted as 3.5 cars in
2012 and 2013, as 2.5 cars in 2014, 1.5 cars in 2015, and as 1 car from 2016. That is, super-credits allow car
manufacturerstomaintainmorecarbon-intensivevehicleﬂeetsthanstipulatedbythevehicleemissionstandard,
iftheydeploysomelow-emissionvehicles.ment take into account pollutants in addition to CO2 emissions. National vehicle
taxationschemesandnationalconsumersubsidiesinFrancealsoencouragecleaner
vehicles.Thesepoliciessupportdevelopmentofgreentechnologiessuchashydrogen







decrease the fuel import dependency for the EU area. This side-beneﬁt is partly
remunerated through the exemption from fuel taxation and incentivised by vehicle
ﬂeetemissionstandards.
Publicsupportgap









term distortion of labour and capital markets. Any pan-European industrial policy
should take these risks into account. There is currently no public instrument to
evaluateandaddressthesenear-termlabourandcapitalmarketsrisks.
Infrastructure initiatives are fragmented across countries, with individual countries
prioritisingelectriccharging,naturalgasoutlets,biofuelsorhydrogen.Infrastructure
development for the energy transition requires a concerted eﬀort and a careful
consideration of technology choices and compatibility. The future of European
transport depends on an infrastructure which allows for a large domestic European








Industrial policy support for new technologies must be carefully chosen due to the
riskynatureofinvestmentintonascentmarketsandtechnologies.Currently,support
forvariouscleanenergytechnologiesisfragmentedandhighlypoliticallydriven.






in for the chosen technologies. Network eﬀects on the consumer side must be
compensatedfororaddressedinordertodevelopsuﬃcientdemandandencourage
business exploration into new markets. First-mover disadvantages of business
exploration may also be examined as these are not directly addressed by current
policies.
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2. The price signal must have a long-term component, ie it should signal that
pollution rights will be scarce beyond 2020 in order to encourage low-carbon
investment;
3. The price signal has to account for international spill-overs, eg there should be
incentives for investments in low-carbon technologies that help to reduce
emissionsoutsideEurope.
Currentcarbonpricingapplicationsfailwhenmeasuredagainstthesecriteria.Europe’s
emissions trading system is unilateral (only EU), short-term (EU legislation beyond
2020issubjecttorevision)andpartial(onlysomesectorsarecoveredintheEU).In
theabsenceofauniversalandlong-termpriceoncarbon,complementaryinstruments











technologies are introduced. Consumers start to use the technology more because
theeﬃciencyimprovementleadstolowervariablecost(priceeﬀect),andconsumers
have more income available to purchase the service (income eﬀect). Thus, if a car




ﬁnd that higher prices for conventional fuels drive the rate of energy-eﬃciency
innovation. Thus, internalising the climate externality in the cost of fossil fuels can
stimulateinnovation.
Anarbitrarypriceoncarbonis,however,noteﬃcient.Theproposedcarboncomponent
in the fuel tax35is insuﬃcient to ensure eﬃcient, economy-wide greenhouse gas
mitigation.Onlyabroadschemeprovidingasinglecarbonpriceacrosssectorswould
ensure cost-optimal abatement. Including transport in the ETS could achieve this.
Implementationcouldtaketheformofobligingfueloutletstobuyemissionallowances
forthefueltheysell.Thiswouldresultintheharmonisationofthecarbonpriceacross
sectors and incentivise the use of the cheapest available abatement options. This is
importantbecause,ifacarbontaxweretobeimplementedforroadtransport,andwas
diﬀerent from marginal abatement costs in others ETS sectors, eﬃciency would be
compromised because transport fuels produced in diﬀerent sectors would have
diﬀerentabatementcosts.Forexample,theelectricityusedinelectricvehicles(orfor








a necessary (but not a sufﬁcient) condition to efﬁciently address the climate
externality.
3.1.2Financialinstrumentstolock-inalong-termcarbonprice
The framework underpinning a long-term carbon price should be credible in order to
support the large investments needed. Currently, the EU emission cap for 2020, the




commitment to a tight emissions trading system in the absence of an international
agreement, second-best options for creating investment certainty should be
considered.Acarbonﬂoorpricemightseemattractivetotoday’slow-carboninvestors.
Howeverageneralﬂoorpriceisaratherinﬂexibletool.Incasefuturecarbonreduction
potential turns out to be much cheaper than anticipated (eg because of new
technologies or lower economic growth) a high ﬂoor price could result in carbon
reductionsbecomingneedlesslyexpensive.Inaddition,apoliticallysetﬂoorissubject
tochangeandhencenotcredibleinthelongterm.
A more targeted alternative could be bilateral option contracts between public
institutions and investors. The public institutions would guarantee a certain carbon
pricetoaninvestor37.Incasetherealisedcarbonpriceisbelowtheguaranteedprice,
the public institution (the option writer) will pay the diﬀerence to the investor (the
optionholder)38.Hence,incaseofalowcarbonpricethatmightbedetrimentaltothe
competitiveness of a low-carbon investment the investor gets some compensation.
Thus,theinvestor’sriskisreduced.Atthesametime,ifthepublicinstitutionissuesa
large volume of option contracts, it creates an incentive not to water down future
climatepolicies.Policiesthatreducethecarbonpricewillhaveadirectbudgetimpact









38. Menus of option contracts with diﬀerent characteristics (strike price, option type, maturity) might be oﬀered to
investors.Such instruments could be provided by a green investment bank – as described in
section3.4.Forexample,long-termloanstogreeninvestmentprojectswouldnotbe






In the absence of a global carbon price, companies will under-invest in low-carbon
technologies because consumers outside Europe will be unwilling to pay a mark-up
for low-carbon products. Consequently, incentives should be established for
companies to invest more in green technologies. The legislation on vehicle ﬂeet
emission standards (see chapter 2) that requires car producers to ensure that their
cars sold in Europe have average CO2 emissions per kilometre below a certain
threshold is an example of an eﬀective approach. Predictably, imposing stricter
thresholds gives producers an incentive to invest in clean alternative technologies.
For many consumers, reasonable vehicle emission standards will come at no
additional cost, as the higher purchase price of vehicles is largely compensated for
byfuelsavingsassociatedwithemissionreductions.Ithasbeenarguedthatmarkets
alone might not be suﬃcient to incentivise consumers to pay a premium for low-
consumption vehicles, the higher costs of which are recovered through later fuel
savings. Consumers do not properly account for future fuel savings when buying
vehicles,inparticularbecausebuyersofnewcarsthatshapethefuturecarﬂeetare





by the California Air Resources Board have become quasi-standards for most
internationally sold models. Correspondingly, ambitious European vehicle-ﬂeet
standardsforgreenhousegasemissionsarelikelytoinduceotherregulatorstofollow.









Chapter 1 showed that the market will not provide the optimal level of infrastructure
deployment, while chapter 2 demonstrated that a lack of infrastructure will hamper
the deployment of new technologies. Consequently, establishing proper incentives
forearlyinvestmentininfrastructureiscrucial.
3.2.1Option1:publicfunding
In the phase after their installation, most stations for newly introduced low-carbon
fuels(suchashydrogen,exchangeablebatteries,biofuels,naturalgas)willseelimited
use.Duetotheinitiallowload,moststationsmightonlybeabletocovertheirvariable
costs in the ﬁrst decade. Without a clear prospect of recovery of their ﬁxed costs,
private companies would refrain from installing new fuelling stations. Public funding





be a direct subsidy. Alternatively, it could be organised by placing obligations on




First, due to the initial low density of fuel stations, there would be a lack of (local)
competition. Consequently, each fuel station would have an interest in exercising
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would need to regulate prices in order to ensure the optimal uptake of the new
technology.Thisischallenginginsuchanewmarket.Duetothediﬀerentloadfactors
of the fuel stations, the variable cost per unit of fuel (eg labour cost) would vary
signiﬁcantly. Thus, the optimal fuel price is diﬀerent at each location, which makes
regulation diﬃcult. That is, even if the state supports the deployment of new fuel
stationsitcouldthennotsimplyletcompetitionworktodeterminetheoptimalprices.
Second, there are a number of individual transport technologies claiming that
infrastructure is the missing ingredient preventing them becoming a competitive
solution to the clean-transport challenge. Compressed natural gas, liqueﬁed natural
gas,electricity,batteryswitching,hydrogenandothersarecompetingforinfrastructure
roll-out support. Funding for refuelling infrastructure for all of these technologies is










late and at a too high price, thus delaying the implementation of new technologies.













Because the individual investments are signiﬁcantly lower, refuelling stations only
enjoy natural monopoly conditions in small local markets. As the market grows, the
fuelstationslosetheirmonopolystatusbecausenewplayersenterthelocalmarket
(possiblyatlowercost)oftenbeforetheincumbentcanrecoveritsinitialﬁxedcost.To
avoid this, the optimal strategy for individual fuelling stations would be to start with
highhydrogenpricesinordertoquicklyrecovertheirﬁxedcosts43.Ifallfuelstations
actinthisway,thepriceofhydrogenwillbehighandthetechnologywillnotproliferate.
Thus, we suggest creating a temporary consortium that develops a roll-out strategy
forrefuellingstations.Allnewrefuellingstationsandtheirfuelpricewouldbeapproved
by this consortium. In addition, it might be agreed that car manufacturers and/or










the right to establish (positive lump sum). For remote areas with low potential load,
monetary incentives might be required (negative lump sum). This money could be
collectedfromauctionsof‘sweetspots’aswellasfromverticalarrangementswithcar
manufacturersandhydrogenproducersthathaveaninterestinthedevelopmentofthe
infrastructure44. This self-regulated, vertically integrated consortium should be able
toworkwithoutadditionalpublicsupportanditsexemptionfromcompetitionshould
automaticallyend(after10yearsforexample).






slotsgetsaccesstomorepotentiallyproﬁtableslots.consumer representatives should ensure that it is not misused for establishing
collusionwithinthefuel-retailsectororanyotheradjacentsector(carmanufacturers,
hydrogenproducers).
One important issue is time consistency. That is, it should be ensured that
governments will not breach the agreement (exemption from competition, no
administrativepriceregulation)aftertheirreversibleinvestmentshavebeenmade.In
addition,theregulatorymodelfortheperiodwhentheconsortiumﬁnishesshouldbe
sketched out to enable consistent investment decisions. Ex-ante price or revenue
regulationorex-postpricecontrolarepotentialmodelsthatwouldrequireanin-depth
analysis.
The cost (potential anti-competitive eﬀects) and beneﬁts (faster roll-out of the
infrastructure) of such an entity need to be carefully balanced. A corresponding
analysisthattakesaccountofcompetitiveeﬀectsatallstagesofthevaluechaingoes
beyondthescopeofthisstudy.Onlyafterapositiveevaluationofthedynamiceﬀects,
might the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition grant the
necessarytemporaryexemption.
One recent example of such a consortium is the initiative for natural gas vehicles in
Germany(seeBox12).
The establishment of a consortium for the deployment of refuelling infrastructure




Providing public ﬁnancial support is a common way of compensating private actors
forthepositivespill-overstheirinvestment/consumptiondecisionscreateforothers45.
(Co-)fundingindustrialR&Danddemonstrationprojects,forexample,issupposedto
enable commercially non-viable but socially beneﬁcial private investments in new
technologiestobreakeven.However,simpleacross-the-boardco-fundingtendstobe
not very well focused (see Box 13 for some numerical illustrations of pro-quota co-























in the ‘Natural Gas Mobility Initiative’, which is coordinated by Deutsche Energie-




Take-home message: The deployment of natural gas vehicles in Europe is an






To illustrate possible weaknesses in the public co-ﬁnance model, we present
diﬀerent scenarios with diﬀerent realisations of the unknown beneﬁts and cost
which result in diﬀerent social welfare impacts. We assume in each scenario that


































Here, we ﬁnd that a socially detrimental project is funded. This project is funded
because public co-funding has made an unproﬁtable project proﬁtable for the








Here, we ﬁndthat the projectdoes not occur,because, even withco-ﬁnancing,
theprivategainswouldbenegative.Investmentdoesnotoccur.Insuﬃcientco-
ﬁnancingleadstounderinvestmentandthepotentialsocialwelfaresurplusof
100islost.section) and co-funding have been introduced (see section 3.6 for an evaluation of
thecurrentco-fundingschema).
One way to avoid overcompensation (scenario 1 and scenario 2 in Box 13) is to
disbursepublicfundsintheformofreimbursablegrants(ornon-reimbursableloans)46.
Reimbursable grants allow mitigation of the technology and market risks for new
technologies by providing reimbursable public funding to demonstration and early




shifted to the public sector. In this context it is important that the risks the private
sector can control (eg the management of the project) are not shifted, as otherwise
theprivateincentivestoensuresuccessarebiased.
Reimbursablegrantsarealreadyusedinsomememberstatestostimulateresearch






Low-carbon projects are currently often more risky than conventional projects for
variousreasons:(1)Thecash-ﬂowofmanylow-carbonprojectsiscriticallydependent
on the hard-to-predict future carbon price. The carbon market is not yet well-
established.Therearenoclearaccountingrulesforcarboncreditsandnogoodmodels
for hedging corresponding risks. (2) Currently, low-carbon projects rely primarily on
government intervention schemes (subsidies, feed-in tariﬀs, obligations, emissions











Reimbursable grants are attributed by the funding agency to a company or a con-
sortium.Thegrantischaracterisedby(a)theratioRbetweenthereimbursablegrant
andthetotalcostoftheprojectandby(b)thetermsoftherefundingprocedure.The
ratio R cannot exceed a maximum value that depends on the nature of funded
projects(basicresearch,experimentaldevelopment,industrialinnovation,etc).







even in case of project/market failure. It is only if the company goes bankrupt
that this amount is not reimbursed. This systematic reimbursement usually
rangesfrom10percentto50percentofthetotalgrant.
3. The amount of the eﬀective reimbursement, taking into account technical and
commercialsuccessoftheproject:
• Incaseofsuccess(i.e.whenthecumulatedturnovergeneratedbytheproject
reaches a ﬁrst threshold), the grants are reimbursed by the grantee. This





• If the cumulative turnover generated by the project crosses a second
threshold,proﬁtcanbesharedbetweenthefundingagencyandthegrantee,
in the form of a percentage of sales (with a limited duration and a maximum
amountthatisspeciﬁedintherefundingprocedure).
• In case of partial success, the amount to be refunded is negotiated, takingTHEGREATTRANSFORMATION
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intoaccountthetechnicalandcommercialachievementsoftheproject.


























implementation of this instrument is critical to its eﬀectiveness – ie the
establishment of thresholds, adequate penalties for non-repayment, and proﬁt
accountingcriteria.ofpolitical,technicalandregulatoryuncertainty.RecentregulatoryshiftsinEuropean
renewables support schemes are telling examples of the political volatility of public
support. For example, Spain and other countries cut their feed-in tariﬀs for existing
and new solar installations because of the ﬁnancial crisis. This resulted in a wave of
bankruptciesofsolarcompaniesandalossofconﬁdenceofinvestorsincorresponding
schemes throughout Europe. Regulatory downside risk is not matched by a
correspondingregulatoryupside.Thereasonisthatregulatorychangesaretypically
targetedatcreating‘additionality’andthusonlycompensateforinvestmentsinduced
by the new regulation but ignore existing low-carbon projects. (4) Furthermore, the
regulatory framework for new infrastructure assets (eg hydrogen fuelling stations)
and new appliances (eg technical standards for FCEVs) remain unclear. These
regulatoryrisksarefurtherexacerbatedbytheoftenlong-termandcapital-intensive
natureoflow-carboninvestments.
Political, technical, and regulatory uncertainty is a signiﬁcant impediment to private
ﬁnance. Uncertainty, in contrast to risk, cannot be properly quantiﬁed or managed.
Consequently, the absence of a robust regulatory environment and a credible and
suﬃcient carbon price signal translates into higher costs of capital for low-carbon
projects.Privateinvestorsfaceariskofstranded,orredundant,costswhicharediﬃcult
tomanage.Thisleadstotheinabilityoflow-carbonprojectstoattractlong-termdebt
and equity ﬁnance, while public funding is insuﬃcient to cover all the gaps in
investment.
A potential solution to the ﬁnancing issues faced by low-carbon projects is being
explored by the UK. The UK Green Investment Bank (GIB) has been proposed as a
publicly-driven intermediary structure. The core tasks of this institution would be to
address the market failures faced by low-carbon projects, and to attract private
investmentbymanagingtheinherentrisksoflow-carbonprojects.Thenovelaspectof





technologies. Second, it will be responsible for issuing green bonds. In the set-up
phase,low-carbonprojectsareﬁnancedbyequity.Attheendofthisphase,whenthe






through additional state guarantees. That is, ultimately, the GIB allows institutional










completed renewables assets, extreme events insurance, contingent loans
facilities).
Comparable instruments have also been implemented in other member states (see
Box 15). They do not, however, share the unique institutional framing of the GIB. The
maindrawbackoftheGIBisitslegally-limitedborrowingpower.Thecurrentlegislation
only permits the GIB to borrow until 2015-16, on the condition that public sector net
debtwilldeclineasapercentageofGDP48.
Even though, it is too early to evaluate the success of the GIB, the idea for the
establishmentofaspecialﬁnancialinstitutionthatwillberesponsibleformanagingthe
specialrisksoflow-carbonprojectsiswellworthexploring.Suchaninstitutionmight
play a major role in attracting the long-term private capital needed for funding
commerciallow-carboninvestmentscriticaltothesuccessofapost-carbontransition.
Furthermore, a public ﬁnancial institution that is largely exposed to low-carbon





48. Sources: Unlocking investments to deliver Britain’s low carbon future, Report of the GIB Commission, (2010);
‘Acceleratinggreeninfrastructureﬁnancing:outlineproposalsforUKgreenbondsandinfrastructurebank‘,Climate
ChangeCapitalbrieﬁngnote,March2009;Helmetal(2009);
http://www.businessandleadership.com/sustainability/item/29090-uk-green-bank-plan-doesnt49. The Green Deal is the UK carbon emissions reduction project. The purpose of the Green Deal is to encourage as
manypeopleaspossibletotakemeasurestomaketheirhomesmoreenergyeﬃcientbyprovidingupfrontloans
forsuchmeasures.
it easier to ﬁnance low-carbon projects through commercial banks. Thus, the











Green Fund initiative launched in 1995. By purchasing shares in a green fund, or
investingmoneyinagreenbank,citizensareexemptedfrompayingcapitalgains
tax and receive a discount on income tax. Investors can therefore accept a lower
interestrateontheirinvestment,whilebankscanoﬀergreenloansatalowercost

















theenergysavingsthatresultfromimprovedeﬃciency.A European institution (such as the European Investment Bank) could be used to
attract private capital for low-carbon projects by offering services comparable to




Networked technologies such as transportation pose a fundamental public policy
dilemma.Thelackofaubiquitousnetworkmaylimittheutilityofthenewtechnology
to consumers; and, as we have seen, reduce the home country’s ability to capitalise
abroad on its technological leadership. But choosing a network early on poses
signiﬁcantrisksoflock-in,andinvitesrent-seekingonthepartofindustrialinterests.
Thepublicsectorisoneofthebiggestcustomersfornewvehicles.Furthermore,some







buses and government vehicles – provide a suitable environment for these trials.
Municipal governments require transportation infrastructure, operate at signiﬁcant
scaleforasinglebuyer,andpotentiallycoordinatebetweenoperationsandmonitoring
andevaluation.However,wenotethatrelyingonmunicipalgovernmentsaloneposes
several risks. First, no municipal government wishes to make large-scale and






Instead, we propose that national governments or European institutions cooperate
with municipalities to structure a coherent series of trials of new transportation
technologies.Regionalornationalgovernmentsmayhavethecapacitytosupportpart
of the ﬁnancial cost of the trial, insulating municipal governments from the risk of
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governments or European institutions should insist on a coherent approach to
selecting the technologies that are deployed in diﬀerent circumstances. In an ideal
world,thiscouldtaketheformofarandomisedexperiment.Thetheoreticaldiﬃculties
of eﬀectively structuring such an experiment for large infrastructure projects may
forestallthisoption.Butevenifthisprovesimpractical,thegovernmentassumingthe
risk should also insist on a neutral approach to selecting and deploying the
technologiesinquestion,andshoulddesignuniversalevaluationcriteria.
Germany’sE-energieprogrammesmayprovideanexampleofawell-structuredproject
in a diﬀerent industrial domain. The E-energie programmes provide six trial projects
for another example of networked technologies, the smart grid. Like low-emissions
transport technologies, the smart grid oﬀers huge promise for eﬃciency
improvements and emissions reduction, but massive technological risk. It also
provides little utility without widespread deployment. By providing six diﬀerent trial












approach towards technology choice is not eﬃcient (3.6.3). A more sound and
predictable support mechanism is necessary (3.6.4). Combined with horizontal
policies such technology speciﬁc support could form a consistent policy response
(3.6.5).
3.6.1Limitsoftechnologyneutrality
Some horizontal policies already exist, targeting for example the climate and
innovationexternality.Carbonpricing,patentlegislation,taxesonfossilfuels,funding
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technology-neutral. The approaches proposed in this report, to compensate for
ineﬃcient or insuﬃcient climate policies, are not technology-speciﬁc either.
Furthermore, the suggested infrastructure consortium might likewise be applied to
other emerging green technologies that require a dedicated infrastructure. However,
the existing and proposed measures will not eliminate all externalities identiﬁed in
thisreport.
Hence, governments have implemented menus of additional support mechanisms
speciﬁcally targeted at certain green technologies. Public R&D (co-)funding policies
target the innovation externality, and public ﬁnancial support for demonstration
projectstargetthebusiness-explorationexternality.Thesepoliciesmayreapeventual




technologies would not only be extremely expensive50, it would also ignore the fact
that diﬀerent technologies are contemporaneously in diﬀerent stages of their
development.
3.6.2Thetechnologychoicechallenge
Decisions about which technology to support, and when and how to support it, are
extremelydiﬃcult,astheyinvolvetheevaluationoftechnologiesofunknownfuture
merits. Furthermore, the social value of each technology is not self-standing, but
depends on the performance of all competing technologies. Thus, simply funding all
technologies according to their – already diﬃcult to establish – individual societal
valueisnotoptimalinthepresenceofcompetingtechnologies.
And errors could be costly. The argument that doing a bit too much for one green
technology might be forgivable, on the basis of erring on the safe side does not
necessarilyhold.Inthepresenceofmultiplenewtechnologiesthatcompetenotonly
foramarketbutalsoforproductionfactors,excessivesupporttoonetechnologymight
even slow development. Government action may provide a focal point for a ‘less-
eﬃcient’ technology, directing not only its own ﬁnancial resources but also other
production factors (skilled labour, capital, etc) away from the more eﬃcient
THEGREATTRANSFORMATION
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50. For example, as discussed in section 3.3, undiﬀerentiated co-ﬁnancing could create signiﬁcant windfall proﬁts
andwastage.technologies.Thus,aneventualbreak-throughofthemoreeﬃcienttechnologiesmay
be delayed. In the presence of network eﬀects, a more eﬃcient technology might
becomelockedoutduetoearlysupportofalesseﬃcientcompetingtechnology.
In addition, because of the high uncertainties inherent in an energy and transport
systemtransition,itislikelythatsometechnologieswillnotliveuptotheirpromises.
Selectingaportfoliooftechnologiesiswarrantedinordertomakethevitaltransition
resilient to unexpected shocks. Consequently, the question is how to design a
mechanism that evaluates all available technologies in order to ensure that public
support is channelled to a portfolio of technologies, in order to underpin the most
eﬀectiveandeﬃcienttransition.
3.6.3Statusquo
Current support policies are not technology-neutral. Typically, governments deﬁne
budgetstosupportindividualtechnologies.Thesebudgetsarethenallocatedbythe





models are usually submitted by stakeholders with vested interests. Furthermore,
coordination of support (eg controlled experiments discussed in section 3.5) rarely
occursontheinternational,orevenEuropeanornationallevels,andstronglydeviating
national support measures might point to hidden state aid51. Consequently, current




choices of a technology portfolio should not be driven by the question of ‘which’ but
by the question of ‘how’. Governments should adopt choice mechanisms that are
dynamicandadaptive,abletodigestnewinformationandoptimisesupportinaquick,




51. Consequently, technology-speciﬁc support is regularly subject to state aid inquiries by national and European
competitionauthorities.in technology. An adaptive technology-choice mechanism, able to self-evaluate and
evolve to meet changing technology choice needs, would also serve to avoid
institutionallock-in52.Asinallpolicyﬁeldsthereisatrade-oﬀbetweenﬂexibilityand




the right expectations over the direction of technology. The only way to control the
potential impacts of public policy on industry investment choices is through a
transparent policy clearly communicating government priorities and decision
parameters. Transparency also promotes fair competition and inspires trust on the





and climate action change). The interest of governments is to support the optimal
portfolio of technologies in terms of certain metrics – such as costs, timeline,
eﬃciency,beneﬁtsandsafety.Thesemetricsandprioritiesshouldbeastechnology-
neutral as possible, and should be the driving force behind the technology-choice
mechanism.
All stakeholders involved in the selection of new technologies face the problem of















53. Themeritsofatechnologyportfolioarediscussedinsection1.2.7.in order to attract more support (or even lock out competitors). Therefore, the public
technology-choicemechanismmustbeonethatiterativelyelicitsunbiasedestimates
fromindustry.
One example of a mechanism for achieving this would be for companies/
consortia/academia to oﬀer a ‘menu’ of diﬀerent support options for the develop-




and a reward for achieving it (a low interest rate for example). Thus, using monetary
incentives, government may be able to elicit more accurate cost and quality
informationfromindustry.




Coordination of Energy Regulators, the Strategic Energy Technology Information
System,oranewinstitution.
This process should be repeated after a certain interval to update assumptions and
adapttoachangingtechnologicalenvironment.Iffeasible,atriggershouldbedeﬁned
so that this process is initiated outside of the predetermined cycle when new
developments warrant it. The deﬁnition of such mechanisms is beyond the scope of
this report, but the ﬁeld of microeconomic engineering holds promise for potential
solutions to information issues faced in technology decisions for the transport and
energytransition.
At the very least, such mechanisms may provide a better avenue for choice
mechanism deﬁnition than a simple ‘shot-in-the-dark’ deﬁnition of thresholds or
numbers (such as 50-50 co-ﬁnancing or one-million cars in 2020). A European
mechanism for allocating support to technologies can create a level playing ﬁeld for
competingtechnologies.Itmaypromotemorecoordinationbetweenregions,nations
andcompanies.ThecostofthetransitionisputatseveralpercentagepointsofGDP54.














Political and practical constraints limit the applicability of technology-neutral
approaches. Some market failures are better dealt with by technology-speciﬁc
instruments. However, there is a signiﬁcant risk of government providing support to
thewrongtechnologiesatthewrongpointintimewiththewronginstrument.
Apredictableandeconomicallysoundmechanismforallocatingsupportcouldreduce
the cost of transition to a new transport and energy system. This would require that
policymakersmovefromad-hocallocationstospeciﬁctechnologiestoamoremodel-
basedapproachtowardstheprovisionofsupport.Evenifpolicymakersareunwilling
to cede discretionary power over support decisions to a European transition model,
buildingupopenandtransparentpublicmodellingcapabilitiesisano-regretoption.It
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It covers nine competing technologies (gasoline, diesel, hybrid, biofuels, LPG-CNG,
battery electric vehicles, range extender, plug-in hybrid, fuel cell). The car market is
divided into diﬀerent submarkets (privately owned household cars, rental cars, cars







models, and is based on the Kraftfahrtbundesamt (KBA – Federal Motor Transport
Authority) categorisation in use in the German administration. It includes 11 vehicle
sizecategories(microcar,subcompactcar,compactcar,mid-sizecar,uppermedium-
sized, executive car, sports utility vehicles, sports cars, minivan, people-carrier, and
light freight vehicles). The model is ‘dynamic’, ie the market shares of respective
technologies and segments are a function of the time-dependent value of car
attributes.
The car purchase discrete choice model is based on a meta-analysis of stated-
preferencesurveysandconstructsasyntheticutilityfunctionbasedonwillingness-









target with respect to the factors described above lead to the achievement of the
market penetration objectives posed by the various stakeholders – namely a 25
percent share of new purchases by 2050? Secondly, what are the consequences of
missing the targets to the market uptake? Furthermore, diﬀerent support scenarios































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Decarbonising Europe’s energy and transport systems
Europe’s energy and transport systems face the major challenge of cutting their
carbon footprints to near zero. Due to the limited carbon-reduction potential of
incumbent technologies, new low-carbon technologies will have to enter the
mainstream market. Some of those new technologies offer significant side-
benefits such as reducing local pollutant and noise emissions. Decarbonising
the economy based on new technologies is also likely to  generate growth.
This report, which is based on research that received funding from the Fuel Cell
and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking, argues that to change a system that is so
locked in to incumbent technologies, and to make decarbonisation growth friend-
ly, a consistent policy approach is needed. The scope, geographical coverage and
duration of carbon pricing should be extended. By setting a higher carbon price,
incentives for developing and investing in new low-carbon technologies are creat-
ed. Temporary consortia for new infrastructure to solve early-phase market
failures could be put in place. This is discussed using the example of hydrogen
vehicles. Finally, an open and public transition model is needed so that second-
best transport solutions are not given a head start that later cannot be reversed.
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to international economics. It is
supported by European governments and international corporations. Bruegel’s
aim is to contribute to the quality of economic policymaking in Europe through
open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, analysis and discussion.
ESMT European School of Management and Technology is an international
management school with a distinctly European focus, founded by 25 leading
German companies and associations. ESMT is located in Berlin with cam-
puses in Munich and Cologne.
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